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I. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE
The concept of a real property lease has been undergoing
change throughout the life of Anglo-American jurisprudence;
however, this change has been often so slow as to give the appear-
ance of dormancy. In recent years real property leases have been
encrusted with property law characteristics to the extent that
other characteristics which they may possess have been largely
hidden from view. Yet, there is an aspect of such leases that has
been inherent in them for many years and is now beginning to
break through to the surface and be recognized and used. This
aspect-the contractual nature of real property leases-forms the
subject matter of this paper.
There are two interrelated factors that have affected the con-
cept of a leasehold interest in real property as it exists today.
First, the historical setting of a lease has changed from that of
rural England, where raw land, devoid of any but the most simple
improvements, was leased for agricultural purposes to that of
urban America, where space provided by valuable and extensive
improvements on the land serves both residential and commercial
needs in our society. The leased farm and pasturage of our Eng-
lish and American ancestors has largely given way to the multi-
storied complex or office building or industrial plant of late-twen-
tieth-century America.
Second, the property characteristic of a lease of real estate was
the characteristic which best served the needs of our recent ances-
tors when they were concerned with the leasing of unimproved
land for agricultural purposes or for pasturage. Although this
characteristic of a lease was not the first it possessed, having gone
through earlier evolutionary stages, it is the characteristic which
has been carried into the twentieth century and with which our
present society must cope. Although our society has changed
dramatically from that known by our recent ancestors, the lease-
hold in real property, as a functional tool, has not kept pace.
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More and more the judicial, educatioal and professional segments
of the legal profession are calling for a redefinition of a real prop-
erty lease to include a contractual aspect in order that this legal
tool may better serve our present needs.
There have been three sources injecting contract principles into
real property leases. The first source has been public policy, used
by the judiciary to mold common law leasehold principles to fit
modern day needs. The second source has been federal and state
statutes. Some statutes have been directly aimed at real property
leases; others, in particular the Uniform Commercial Code, which
is enjoying wide adoption across the United States, have been
indirectly affecting attitudes toward leases. And the third source
has been local ordinances, such as housing codes, that have placed
the rights and responsibilities of lessors and lessees in a new light.
Each of these sources has been more useful than the others in
dealing with certain aspects of leases; yet, all three have been
needed for a full development of the cotractual nature of real
property leases.
The subject-matter covered in this paper includes both residen-
tial and commercial leases. Some of the principles discussed, such
as unconscionable clauses, are applicable primarily to residential
leases, but most are applicable to both types. The investigation of
this subject has been limited to leases of real property. The fol-
lowing types of leases have not been included: leases of person-
alty, leases of advertising space, crop leases, mining leases, mineral
leases or oil and gas leases.
II. THE NATURE OF A REAL PROPERTY LEASE
A. Origin and History
In order to fully appreciate the nature of a modern lease of real
property, it is necessary to understand the origin of this legal
concept and the transformations it has undergone over the years.
An appreciation of these transformations helps to explain the
problem legal authorities have had in identifying and utilizing
the various aspects of a lease. It is necessary to step back in his-
tory in order to set the stage for an analysis of the contractual
nature of real property leases.
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1. Creation of Status in the Lessee
The earliest interest that a lessee had in a lease was that of
status. In order to understand this concept one must keep in
mind the difference between free tenure and unfree tenure. The
character of the services due the lord by his tenant formed the
chief test for the differentiation between these two forms of land-
holding. If the services were definite and certain, and, conse-
quently, worthy of a free man, the tenure was classified as free.
However, if the services were uncertain or dependent on the will
of the overlord as to quantity or manner of performance, the ten-
ure was classified as unfree.1 This test resulted in classifying the
great mass of individuals in post Norman-Conquest England, the
workers who performed agricultural and other manual services
for their manorial lord, as villeins, holding their manor lands in
unfree tenure.2
"Villeinage" was considered a status as well as a tenure.3 A
villein was a serf, but not a slave. His position before the thir-
teenth century was quite precarious. He held his cottage and
small strip of land at the will of the lord. His tenure was not
protected in the king's courts. This view of the villein's status
was more than a theoretical legal proposition; it no doubt became
a stark reality to many such unfortunate persons:
It was the law then, that if the tenant in villeinage was eject-
ed, either by his lord or by a third person, the king's court
would not restore him to the land, nor would it give him
damages against his lord in respect of the ejectment. He held
the land nomine alieno, on his lord's behalf; if a third person
ejected him, the lord was disseised. Before the end of the
thirteenth cetury, the king's courts were beginning to state
their doctrine in a more positive shape-the tenant in vil-
leinage is in our eyes a tenant at will of the lord.'
However, such persons were not without some measure of pro-
tection. This protection was provided by manorial courts. In
theory, the protection was very slight-holding at the will of the
lord, the villein tenant could not sue the lord in the manor court;
11 F. Pollock and F. Maitland, TwI HiSTORY OP ENGLISn: LAW 371-72(2ded. 1952).
- 21d. at 372.
3Id. at 358.
4Id. at 360.
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the tenant had no right to alienate and no right to pass the land
on to his heirs.5 In practice, however, the villein tenant's rights
were much greater-the lords lelt themselves bound more or less
conclusively by the terms of the customary unfree tenures, and
such customs, rigidly enforced, became the "law" of the manor
court; the villein tenant, though personally unfree, was not con-
sidered a mere tenant at will, but was considered to hold perma-
nently, frequently heritably, and on somewhat definite terms. 6
In the four centuries following the thirteenth, the status of the
villein tenant continued to improve. Plucknett states that in the
fifteenth century courts of equity and prerogative started protect-
ing villeins, principally where intervention could be justified as
sustaining a manorial custom, and that in the sixteenth century
the common law courts followed this example, while in the seven-
teenth century the villein's rights were established at common law
under the name of copyhold tenure.7
2. Creation of Contractual Rights in the Lessee
During the same period of time forces were at work that were
ultimately to replace the villein tenant, who held at the will of his
lord, with a tenant who held the land for a term of years. With
this change comes an alteration in the lessee's position from that
of a landholder having mere status, albeit protected, to that of a
landholder having recognized contractual rights. Both capitalists
and agricultural workers participated in this change.
Prior to the thirteenth century, leases for a term of years were
principally given by great landowners to moneylenders as a way
of circumventing the church's prohibition of usury.8 A, in consid-
eration of a lump sum amount of money, would grant a term of
years to B of sufficient duration to allow B to recoup both his
consideration and a profit. It is obvious why Plucknett can say
of this type of lessee: "The termor, therefore, is not unnaturally
placed in popular literature in very bad company among usurers
and other scoundrels who prey upon society."9 The law put such
5Lesar, The Landlord-Tenant Relation in Perspective: From Status to
Contract and Back in 900 Years?, 9 KAN. L. REv. 369 (1961).
61 F. Pollock and F. Maitland, supra note 1, at 361, 379-81.
7T. Plucknett, A CoNciss HISTORY Olt THE COMMON LAw, 538 (5th ed.
1956).
81d. at 571-73.
91d. at 572-73.
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a lessee in his "proper place" by giving him little protection in
the enjoyment of his possession.10 Upon ouster the lessee's sole
remedy was an action on the covenant against his lessor; he had
no rights against third parties. The lessee's term was subject to
the dower interests of the lessor's widow and the lessor could
alienate free from the rights of the lessee. Not having an estate
in land, the real actions were denied to the lessee.
Ultimately the mortgage arose as a more satisfactory method
of rendering land as security for a debt and the term of years
became disassociated with the unsavory aspects of moneylending
and became associated with a more respected strata of English
society, the agricultural tenant for years. Economics played a key
role in replacing the villein tenant with the agricultural tenant for
years. As a result of the Black Death (1348-49), and the result-
ing economic revolutions centering on a shortage of agricultural
labor, more and more such laborers started holding agricultural
lands under leases for terms of years.11 The agriculture or hus-
bandry lease, which has formed the basis for so much of the cur-
rent law surrounding leases, became a common form of real
property lease.
The rights of such a lessee were contractual in nature. Not
having seisin in the land, the lessee did not have the benefit of the
real actions. That great possessory remedy, the assize of novel
disseisin, which was available to freeholders, was not available to
a lessee for a term. 12 He was forced to content himself with the
benefit derived from a covenant or warranty. Frequently, how-
ever, the termor had such a benefit. 13 The lessee's right was one
in personam against the lessor and his heirs. It would allow him
specific enforcement of the covenant, recovering possession of the
land. If the lessee were ejected by a third person, he could sue
the lessor for an equivalent of the benefit taken from him, but he
was remedyless against third persons in general.
3. Creation of Property Rights in the Lessee
Beginning in the thirteenth century new causes of action were
given to the lessee for years which were to ultimately result in
101 AM aRICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 1.11 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952) [herein-
after cited as AMERICAN LAW op PROPERTY].
IIT. Plucknett, supra note 7, at 573-74.
122 F. Pollock and F. Maitland, supra note 1, at 36.
13Id. at 106.
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giving him property rights in the land rather than mere contrac-
tual rights. In 1235 the lessee for years was given a new action,
quare ejecit infra terminum, which would restore the ejected lessee
to the land. Although Bracton later said this action would lie
against any ejector, it was actually limited to apply to what was
considered the most odious situations, ejectment by one who had
purchased the land from the lessor.1 4 Later, the lessee was given
the right to recover damages against any and all ejectors through
the fashioning of a special form of trespass, de ejectione firmae,
which became the equivalent of the freeholder's quare clausum
fregit.15 This remedy was expanded in 1499 to allow the lessee
to recover possession of the land. Out of these changes the action
of ejectment emerged, from its originally inferior position, to ulti-
mately replace most of the old forms of real action. Consequently,
the interest of a lessee for years came gradually to be regarded,
not merely as a right of action resting on a covenant by the
lessor, but as a right of property enforceable against any wrong-
doer by a remedy analogous to that to which the owner of a free-
hold was entitled. 16 The lessee was becoming recognized as the
owner of an estate in land.
Because of the fact that the term of years gained popularity,
for reasons previously mentioned, in an age when there were few
urban centers and a majority of the population depended on the
land for livelihood, it is not surprising that the term most often
involved the agricultural use of land.17 The heart of the lease
involved the possession of the land so that crops could be planted,
cultivated and harvested. Rarely would there be any structural
improvements placed on the land; those that were erected were
simple and rather unimportant compared to the land itself and its
use. Out of this situation arose the concept that the rent, the con-
sideraion for the lease, issued out of the land itself, and so long as
the lessee had possession of the land, the consideration would not
fail.18 The rules the common law developed to govern this type
of lease were comparatively simple, reflecting the simplicity of the
14d. at 107-08.
1ST. Plucknett, supra, note 7, at 373.
161 H. Tiffany, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 73 at 108-09 (3d ed. B.
Jones 1939) [hereinafter cited as Tiffany].
17Lesar, supra note 5, at 371.
182. R. Powell, TnE LAW OF REAL PROPMTY §221[1], at 177 (P. Rohan
recomp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Powell].
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leases themselves. 19 It is many of these rules, developed for leases
of rural agricultural lands, that have presented problems in the
twentieth century when applied to leases of urban residential and
commercial land.
4. Status of the Modern Lease
In the last century and a half, there have been emerging factors
in society which have exerted increasing influence on the law
governing leases. There has been a shift in population from rural
areas into urban areas.20 Cities have replaced the farm as the
place where a majority of our population resides and works. As
more and more people have come to live in small geographical
areas, the real property lease has become important for residential
purposes. For many families individual homes have given way
to apartments, which have in turn developed into high-rise living
complexes. In such complexes the residents are not concerned
merely with the right to possession of a plot of ground or a cubic
area of airspace, but are concerned with being furnished with
services such as heating, lighting, plumbing, garbage disposal,
security and recreation.
In this same period of time, as more and more of men's affairs
have been conducted in urban areas, the "business lease" has be-
come more common and of greater social importance than the
agrarian lease. This has caused an increased significance to be
placed on the structures located on leased premises-their quality,
condition, maintenance and terms of use.
These changes in the use of leased premises from agrarian uses
to residential and commercial uses, and the increased relative im-
portance of the strucural improvements on the land as opposed to
the land itself, have caused modern leases to evolve into a form far
different from their agrarian ancestor. The parties to the modern
real estate lease have recognized these changes by placing cove-
nants of greater variety and detail in the lease, in an attempt to
19For a summary of the common law rules, see Lesar, supra note 5, at
371-72.20In 1800 there were approximately fifteen times as many Americans living
in rural areas as in urban areas; in 1960 there were approximately two and
one-half times as many Americans living in urban areas as in rural areas.
See U. S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States.
Colonial Times to 1957, Washington, D.C., 1960; Continuation to 1962 and
Revisions, Series A 195-209 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
1965).
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protect their respective positions.21 This trend has in itself caused
problems. 22 The law, however, has been slower to adapt itself to
this transformation in the real property leases. There is, how-
ever, now recognized to be an intertwining of property law (view-
ing a lease as a conveyance of a nonfreehold estate in real prop-
erty) and contract law (viewing a lease as a bilateral contract)
in a lease that together form its substance.
B. Definition of a Real Property Lease
How may the modern lease of real property be defined? Au-
thorities have never been able to agree-some say that a lease is
a conveyance ;23 others say that it is a contract ;24 while yet others
argue that it is a conveyance with contractual obligations super-
imposed.2 s This disagreement points up the many-faceted aspects
of a real property lease. 26 It also points up the need to be aware
of how the property and contract aspects of a lease may affect a
given situation:
In practice, the law today concerning estates for years con-
sists of rules determining the construction and effect of lease
covenants. Thus the background of a lease as a conveyance,
built solidly by 1500, has a tremendous foreground, evolved
largely since 1880, which is purely contractual in character.
The modern law is the synthesis of these two historical fac-
tors. Sometimes the background peeks through and controls.
Sometimes the foreground is alone considered as determina-
21Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U.L. RV. 1279 (1960).
22See Sections V and VI, infra.
232 W. Blackstone, COMMENTA1ms 316--"A lease is properly a convey-
ance of any lands or tenaments, usually in consideration of rent or other
annual recompense ......2 4Jackson v. Pepper Gasoline Co., 280 Ky. 226, 133 S.W.2d 91 (1939). The
plaintiff-lessor leased land and a building to the defendant-lessee for use as
a service station, reserving as rent an amount equal to one cent per gallon
on each gallon of gasoline delivered to the station, payable monthly. The
plaintiff sought to cancel the lease, claiming it was a unilateral contract and
lacked mutuality. The Kentucky Supreme Court held the lease valid and
not too indefinite to constitute a binding obligation, saying: "The lease from
appellant [lessor] to appellee [lessee] is a bilateral contract, since there are
mutual promises between the parties to the lease."
251 Tiffany § 74, at 110. This authority says that a lease is "... the legal
act or acts by which various contractual obligations are created in connec-
tion with such conveyance, that is, it is applied to an aggregate of simul-
taneous legal acts, by one of which a lesser estate is transferred to another,
and by another or others of which the transferor or transferee, or both,
contract to do or leave undone certain things." This definition describes a
lease as a conveyance plus the covenants of the lease.
261 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11, at 202-05.
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tive. The lawyer's problem is to determine which of these
two factors is to control in his specific controversy.2 7
The sections which follow discuss one of the aspects of a real
property lease-the contractual aspect-in its varied forms.
III. MUTUAL DEPENDENCY OF COVENANTS
One problem concerning the contractual nature of a real prop-
erty lease centers around the mutual dependence of covenants
found in a lease. Are such covenants handled the same way cove-
nants in a contract are? One authority on the law of contracts
has expressed the opinion that a real property lease is a bilateral
contract as well as a conveyance of a property interest.28 What,
then, are the rules surrounding the mutual dependence of cove-
nants in a bilateral contract and to what extent have these rules
been applied to leases?
A. Contract Principles
A bilateral contract is one in which there are mutual promises
between two parties to the contract, each party being both a
promisor and a promisee. 29 In such a contract not only are the
promises consideration for one another, but also the parties nor-
mally expect that the performances promised are to be exchanged
for one another. 30 The promises and the promised performances
are, then, dependent on one another. Just as a failure to give a
promise on one side would cause invalidity of the counter-promise,
so a failure to give performance on one side should deprive the
party in default of a right to enforce performance on the other
side.31
B. Real Property Leases
1. Mutual Independence of Covenants
The general rule governing real property leases is that covenants
272 Powell § 221 [1], at 179.
283A A. Corbin, CONTRACTS §686, at 237 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
Corbin] ; see Section I-B supra.2 9RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 12 (1932).
306 S. Williston, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 813, at 6
(3d ed. W. Jaeger 1962) [hereinafter cited as Williston].'
3lId.; for a discussion of the history of the mutual dependency of bilateral
contracts, see 3A Corbin § 654.
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are considered independent unless expressly32 or impliedly 33 made
dependent. For example, a breach of the lessor's covenant to
repair is no defense to an action to recover rent.3 4 Likewise, a
lessor may not forfeit the lease for failure to pay rent or other
breach of covenant unless he has reserved that power. 35 The rea-
son for this discrepancy between the rule applied to most bilateral
contracts and the rule applied to leases seems to be rooted in his-
tory: the view that a lease is primarily a conveyance, to which
the covenants are merely incidental, and the rules based thereon,
were established before the development of mutual dependency
in contracts. 3 6
2. Bargained-For Covenants Which Go to the
"Whole Consideration" of a Lease
There are some situations, nevertheless, where courts often hold
covenants in a lease to be mutually dependent. For example,
when the covenants go to the "whole consideration" of a lease, i.e.,
when they are vitally important terms of the lease, courts have
treated them as mutually dependent.
A number of cases dealing with residential leases have reached
this decision. In Berman v. Shelby37 the lessor leased a house to
the lessee under a lease whereby the lessee promised to pay rent
and the lessor promised to repair the bathroom and leave certain
furniture in the house. The lessee vacated the premises during
the period of the lease, claiming the lessor did not comply with
his covenants in the lease. The lessor relet the premises and sued
the lessee for the difference between the old and new rents. The
Arkansas Supreme Court held that the lessee was not liable for
the rent, stating that the obligations of the lease were mutual and
the failure of the lessor to comply with the terms of the lease
relieved the lessee from a duty to perform his obligations under
3 2Wurdemann v. Hjilm, 257 Minn. 450, 102 N.W.2d 811 (1960), cert. de-
nied. 364 U.S. 894 (1960).33Brady v. Brady, 140 Md. 403, 117 A. 882 (1922).
34Arnold v. Krigbaum, 169 Cal. 143, 146 P. 423 (1915) ; Hosang v. Minor,
205 Cal. App.2d 269, 22 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1962); see generally Annot., 28
A.L.R.2d 446 (1953).3SBrown v. Bragg, 22 Ind. 122 (1864).36Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1279, at 1281
(1960).
3793 Ark. 472, 125 S.W. 124 (1910).
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the lease. Note that the covenants considered mutually dependent
were express in the lease, evidencing the parties' estimation of
their importance, and that the lessee vacated the premises. This
latter fact is often important in these cases, as will be seen later.38
In Higgins v. Whiting"9 the lessor leased premises to the lessee
under a lease whereby the lessee promised to pay monthly rent
and the lessor covenanted "to supply hot and cold water and to
heat the said apartment during the winter and to supply the usual
janitor services." On February 8, 1924, the lessee notified the
lessor of a lack of heat and stated that he would move unless heat
was supplied. Upon the lessor's failure to provide heat the lessee
moved from the premises and the lessor sued for failure to pay the
rent from that time until the termination of the lease. The New
Jersey court held that the lessor could not recover the rent, stating
that where the covenants are concurrent and to be performed at
the same time, they are dependent and neither party can maintain
an action against the other without averring and proving per-
formance on his part.
The significance of Higgins in this area was weakened by a later
case, Licker v. Rudd,40 where on facts similar to those in Higgins,
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the lessee must vacate
the premises if he proposed to contest the lessor's claim for rent.
The court interprets the problem presented by both Higgins and
Licker as one of constructive eviction, necessitating the lessor's
removal from the premises, rather than one of the mutuality of
covenants in a lease. 41
A third New Jersey case, Steven Stanoyevich Fund v. Stein-
acher,42 also deals with the problem of mutuality of important
covenants in a residential lease. The lessor leased premises to the
lessee under a lease containing a covenant in which the lessor
promised that the heating system was in good working order and
that if the premises were equipped with an oil burner the lessor
would make any necessary repairs not due to the negligence of
the lessee. When the furnace gave off noxious and offensive odors
and heated the lessee's part of the building to 90 degrees without
38See Section III-B-3 infra.
39102 N.J.L. 279, 131 A. 879 (1926).
407 N.J.M. 575, 146 A. 588 (1929).
41See 39 HARv. L REv. 1102 (1926) in conjunction with Higgins v. Whit-
ing and Section III-B-3 infra.
42125 N.J.L. 326, 15 A.2d 772 (1940).
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the ability of the lessee to control the heat, the lessee vacated the
premises, whereupon the lessor sued to recover rent unpaid for the
balance of the term. Relying on Higgins, the court held that the
lessor's failure to furnish a furnace in good condition, or repair
it after notice of defect, was a breach of his covenant which would
justify a breach of the lessee's covenant to pay rent.
Even more than residential leases, commercial leases have given
rise to the problem of the mutuality of covenants vital to the lease.
In Tedstrom v. Puddephat43 the lessor leased commercial prem-
ises to the lessee by a lease which stated that if the premises were
destroyed by fire either party had a right to cancel the lease. The
premises were damaged by fire and the lessee sought to cancel the
lease. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the premises were
not destroyed, only damaged; therefore, the lessee could not cancel
the lease. But the court, in dicta, used the following language
that was later to be applied to commercial leases in Arkansas, as
had earlier been applied to residential leases :44
. . . the covenants in a lease on the part of a lessor, and
the agreement on the part of a lessee to pay the rent, are
mutual undertakings, and the refusal by the one party to per-
form his part of the contract may justify the other party in
treating the contract as rescinded. [Citations omitted.] So
that the failure on the part of the lessor to perform his cove-
nants in the lease may justify the abandonment of the prem-
ises by the lessee, and may work a cessation of the rent. Ber-
man v. Shelby, 93 Ark. 472, 125 S.W. 124.45
The Arkansas Supreme Court utilized both Berman and Ted-
strom in Felder v. Hall Bros. Co.,46 a case where the lessor leased
farm lands to a business lessee by a lease which provided that
(1) the lessee would pay a stipulated rent, (2) the lessee would
have a right to renew the original eight-year term for an additional
ten-year period, and (3) the lessee covenanted to keep the prem-
ises in good repair. At the end of the original term the lessor
sued to eject the lessee, claiming that the lessee had no right to
an extension of the lease because it failed to keep the premises in
4399 Ark. 193, 137 S.W. 816 (1911) ; see also Ashmore v. Hays, 159 Ark.
234, 252 S.W. 11 (1923).44See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
4599 Ark. at 197, 137 S.W at 818.
46151 Ark. 182, 235 S.W. 789 (1921).
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good repair. The lessor was able to prove that the lessee had
failed to keep the premises in good repair. The court held that
the lease could not be automatically extended by the lessee, and
that the lessee had forfited its right to an extension because of its
failure to keep the improvements on the land in good repair.
One of the most celebrated cases in this area is University Club
of Chicago v. Deakin,47 wherein the plaintiff-lessor leased premises
to the defendant-lessee by a lease containing a covenant that,
"Lessor hereby agrees during the term of this lease not to rent any
other store in said University Club building to any tenant making
a specialty of the sale of Japanese or Chinese goods or pearls."
The lessor later leased to one, placing a clause in this lease pro-
hibiting the lessee from using his premises for the specialty of
selling pearls. However, this lessee did use the premises for this
purpose, whereupon the defendant vacated his premises, sought to
cancel his lease and refused to pay further rent. The plaintiff then
sued to collect the unpaid rent. The court held that the lease in
question was a bilateral contract, and that upon breach of an es-
sential element by the lessor, the lessee had a right to refuse to be
bound further by its terms and to surrender possession of the
premises. The court was of the opinion that the lessor's default,
his failure to enforce the covenant in the second lease, was in a
matter vital to the lease in question, and that the defendant had
a right to terminate his lease, surrender possession and refuse to
further perform on his part the provisions of the lease.
A Texas Court of Civil Appeals, in Ingram v. Fred,48 followed
the lead of Arkansas in this area. The lessor rented business
premises to the lessee by a lease which stated that in case the
building should from any cause leak, the lessee should notify the
lessor of this fact and the lessor would have a reasonable time to
repair. When the roof leaked the lessee notified the lessor and
waited for a reasonable time for him to repair, but when he failed
to repair the lessee vacated the premises, refusing to pay rent
further. Upon the lessor's suit to recover the unpaid rent, the
court stated that the English (common law) rule is that if the
lessor is bound by express contract to repair and by his failure to
do so the premises become uninhabitable, or unfit for the purposes
47265 Ill. 257, 106 N.E. 790 (1914).
48210 S.W. 298 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918, error ref'd).
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for which they were leased, the lessee has no right to vacate or
to refuse to pay rent according to his covenant, but his only
remedy is by action for damages. However, the court rejected
that rule and, relying on Berman v. Shelby,49 held that the cove-
nants to pay rent and to repair were mutually dependent, and,
consequently, the lessee was not liable for the unpaid rent.
An unusual case in this area is Stifter v. Hartman,50 where the
plaintiff had discussed with the defendant the rental of one-half of
the former's office to the latter. They discussed sharing the ex-
penses of stenographic service and telephone service. This agree-
ment was not placed in the lease, but was proved by the de-
fendant by parol evidence at the trial to which the plaintiff object-
ed, claiming that parol evidence could not be admissible to alter
or vary the terms of a written lease. After the lease was entered
into the plaintiff refused to share the above named expenses;
therefore, the defendant stopped paying rent. The Michigan Su-
preme Court upheld the decision of the trial court that the agree-
ment as to sharing the named expenses was one of the induce-
,ments that led the defendant to enter into the lease, that the parol
evidence was admissible to prove the inducement, and that when
the plaintiff failed to share these expenses a part of the consider-
ation for the lease failed and the defendant was not liable on
the rent.
Hiatt Investment Co. v. Buehler,51 a case similar to University
Club of Chicago v. Deakin,5 2 expands the remedies of a party to
a lease who has been the victim of a breach of a mutually depen-
dent covenant. Here the lessor leased premises to the lessee by
a lease containing a covenant that the lessor would not lease to
another for the purpose of operating a drugstore in the building.
When the lessor breached this covenant the lessee attempted to
rescind his lease and refused to pay further rent. The court, in
upholding the lessee's right to take this course of action because
the covenant went to the "entire consideration of the lease," said
that the lessee had a choice of remedies: (1) rescind the lease,
in which case he would owe no further rent; (2) continue under
the lease and at the end of the term sure for any loss of profits
49See note 37 supra.
50225 Mich. 101, 195 N.W. 673 (1923).
51225 Mo. App. 151, 16 S.W.2d 219 (1929).52See note 47 supra.
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caused by the lessor's breach of covenant; or (3) treat the breach
of covenant as having ended the lease contract and sue for
damages.
Medico-Dental Bldg. v. Horton & Converse,5 3 factually similar
to both Hiatt Investment Co. and University Club of Chicago,
brings another jurisdiction into the camp of those holding that the
breach of a vitally important covenant in a commercial lease affects
other covenants in the lease. Here the lessor leased premises to
the lessee by a lease in which the lessor promised not to lease to
anyone who would engage in the prescription or pharmacy busi-
ness. The lessee claimed that the lessor's renting to a doctor who
compounded and dispensed drugs to his own patients was a breach
of the covenant, allowing him to rescind the lease. The California
Supreme Court said:
While it is true that a lease is primarily a conveyance . . . it
also presents the aspect of a contract .... This dual character
serves to create two distinct sets of rights and obligations-
"one .. . based on 'privity of estate' and the other . . . based
on 'privity of contract.' " . . . Those features of a lease which
are strictly contractual in their nature should be construed
according to the rules for the interpretation of contracts gen-
erally ....
eal. It is an established rule that those covenants which run
to the entire consideration of a contract are mutual and de-
pendent. . . . Undoubtedly the restrictive covenant in de-
fendant's [lessee'sl lease was of such a nature. 54
The court ruled that there was ample evidence to support the trial
court's findings that the doctor was conducting a drugstore and
that the lessor's acquiescence to this activity amounted to a breach
of the covenant. Therefore, the lessee had a right to rescind the
lease.
This rule concerning the mutual dependency of covenants which
go to the "whole consideration" of a lease has been applied to
defeat the action of a lessee as well as that of a lessor. In Silken
v. Farrell5s the lessee sued his lessor for breach of the covenant
5321 Cal.2d 411, 132 P.2d 457, aff'g 124 P.2d 56 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942);
see also Kulawitz v. Pacific Woodenware & Paper Co., 25 Cal.2d 664, 155
P.2d 24 (1945).
54132 P.2d at 462.
55281 App. Div. 718, 118 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1952, aff'd 4 N.Y.2d 117, 172
N.Y.S.2d 808, 149 N.E.2d 328 (1958).
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of quiet enjoyment. The lessor was able to prove that the lessee
was delinquent in paying taxes he was obligated to pay by the
terms of the lease and that a tax foreclosure was imminent. The
court held that the lessee could not recover unless as a condition
precedent he proved performance on his part. Since it was undis-
puted that he was delinquent in paying taxes, he could not "cast
the indulgent defendant in damages."
In Dave Herstein Co. v. Columbia Pictures Corp.5 6 the lessee
claimed that the lessor breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment
by conducting extensive repairs and demolitions adjacent to the
demised premises. During the time this activity was occurring the
lessee was in arrears in rent. The court held that the payment of
rent was a condition precedent to the enforcement of the covenant
of quiet enjoyment, and, consequently, the lessee could not sue for
damages occurring during the time he was in default in the rent.
Along the same line is Osias v. 21st Borden Corp,57 where the
lessor sued the lessee for possession based on non-payment of rent.
At a time when the lessee was in default of the rent the tempera-
ture of the premises went above 90 degrees and the lessor refused
to remedy this situation. The lessee defended against the suit on
the theory that the overheated nature of the premises and the
failure of the lessor to remedy the condition constituted a partial
constructive eviction which was a breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment. The court held this defense to be ineffective, stating
that the lessee must pay rent as a condition precedent to asserting
constructive eviction or breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
as a defense to a summary proceeding based on non-payment of
rent, or as a counterclaim, or as a separate action for damages.
3. Constructive Eviction as a Substitute for
Mutually Dependent Covenants
The subject of constructive eviction is difficult to separate from
the subject of the mutual dependence of covenants which go to
the "whole consideration" of a lease. Both approaches share the
same characteristics of being attempts on the part of our judicial
system to give some remedy to one whose expectations in a lease
have been frustrated because of the actions on the other party to
56157 N.Y.S.2d 130 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1956), aff'd., 306 N.Y. 585,
115 N.E.2d 686 (1953).
5729 Misc.2d 680, 211 N.Y.S.2d 463 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1961).
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the lease. Some of the cases presented earlier utilize both theories
in protecting one party to a lease from the actions of the other
party. There are, however, significant differences. First, the
theory of constructive eviction is available only to the lessee in a
lease situation, whereas, the theory of mutually dependent cove-
nants is available to both lessor and lessee. Second, the theory
of constructive eviction requires an overt act by the damaged
lessee, vacation of the premises, whereas, the theory of mutually
dependent covenants requires no such act.
There is no doubt, however, that the theory of constructive evic-
tion is a much more established and utilized theory in landlord-
tenant law than is the contractual theory of mutually dependent
covenants. One can find ten constructive eviction cases for every
one relying on the theory of mutually dependent covenants. His-
tory plays a large part in this. Historically, a lease has been re-
garded as a conveyance of an estate in land and the tenant has
been regarded as primarily interested in the land from which the
rents are said to issue.58 For this reason in early common law
only a physical eviction by the lessor of his lessee or a physical
eviction of the lessee by a title paramount suspended the rent. 9
Such evictions were also regarded as a breach of the covenant of
quiet enjoyment. 60 With the change in the character of leases,
discussed earlier, wherein the principal thing of importance came
to be not the land itself but the improvements on the land and the
services furnished in connection with those improvements by the
lessor, the rule that only physical eviction caused rent to be sus-
pended became patently unsatisfactory. Where the lessor so seri-
ously interferes with the lessee's use and enjoyment of the premises
as to result in a frustration of the objectives of the lease, some
recourse should be available to the lessee over and above money
damages. Rather than adopting ordinary contract principles, our
judicial system attempted to find a solution in the field of property
law. The doctrine of constructive eviction is the result of that
search.
Constructive eviction can be defined as any act of a grave and
permanent character by the lessor or those acting under his author-
5BSee 3 Tiffany § 876.
S9Rapacz, Origin and Evolution of Constructive Eviction in the United
States, 1 DE PAUL L. REv. 69 (1951); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 3.50, at 278.
601 Tiffany § 92.
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ity with intent and effect to deprive the lessee of the use, occupa-
tion and enjoyment of the premises or a part thereof, or the estab-
lishment or assertion against the lessee of a title paramount to that
of the lessor, resulting in the lessee's abandonment of the prem-
ises.61 Such a serious interference by the lessor is construed to
have the same legal effect as a physical eviction,62 hence the name
"constructive eviction." In this way the element of physical expul-
sion is dispensed with, being regarded as a technical requirement
that should not be applied.63 The justification for this doctrine
is that any serious interference with the lessee's use, occupation
and enjoyment of the property amounts to a breach of the cove-
nant of quiet enjoyment, 64 generally implied in leases. 65 The ef-
fects of constructive eviction are to terminate the duty of the lessee
to pay rent and to give the lessee the right to sue the lessor for
damages. 66 It is apparent that the former effect is identical to
that arising from an application of the theory of mutually depen-
dent covenants. To say that a serious interference with the use,
occupation and enjoyment of property is a breach of the covenant
of quiet enjoyment, justifying abandonment and a termination of
rent liability, is only another way of saying that the covenant of
quiet enjoyment (or some other covenant of the lessor) and the
covenant to pay rent are mutually dependent so that the failure
to perform one deprives the party in default of a right to enforce
performance on the other side. Numerous authorities have point-
ed this out; one saying that, "The doctrine of 'constructive evic-
tion' . . . has become a respectable property garb for the contract
rule of 'mutuality' ;"67 another saying that "When that [construc-
tive eviction] doctrine is liberally applied, the result reached is
not different than that which would be reached under the contract
rule of mutually dependent covenants ... .
A recent New Jersey case, Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper,69
61Bloomberg v. Evans, 194 N.C. 113, 138 S.E. 593 (1927).
621 AxEmCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 350, at 280.
6 3Rapacz, supra note 59, at 73.6 4 Dyett v. Pendleton, 4 Cow. (N.Y.) 581 (1825), on writ of error, 8 Cow.
(N.Y.) 727 (Court for Correction of Errors, 1826) ; see generally Rapacz,
supra note 59, at 71-74.6 5See Section V-B-1 infra.6 6Rapacz, supra note 59, at 87-89.
672 Powell § 221 [1], at 182 n. 11.
681 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.51, at 282.
6953 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1968).
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illustrates the closely connected nature of three concepts-(1) con-
structive eviction, (2) mutually dependent covenants, and (3) im-
plied warranty of habitability-the first two of which are being
presently discussed and the last of which will be discussed later.70
In this case a lessor sued his lessee to recover unpaid rent. The
lessor had leased the ground floor of a building to the lessee by
a lease which stated that the lessee had inspected the premises,
took them as is, and covenanted to keep them in repair. The lease
included an express covenant of quiet enjoyment. At the trial the
lessee proved that after every rain water flooded into the premises
from an adjacent driveway, due to faulty grading and sealing of
the foundation. Originally the lessor's manager would remove the
water each time. The parties entered into another lease containing
identical provisions, and when the problem was never remedied
by the lessor, despite frequent promises by his manager to do so,
the lessee vacated the premises. The plaintiff-lessor claimed that
the lessee took the premises "as is," that the damage was not per-
manent, and that the lessee had waived any breach of the covenant
of quiet enjoyment by remaining in possession. The lessee de-
fended on the basis that the flooding constituted a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment which amounted to constructive evic-
tion. The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the lessee was
not liable for the unpaid rent on the following bases: (1) the
lease contained an implied warranty that no latent defects existed
on the premises or outside the premises, and that this warranty
was breached by the lessor in this case; (2) the express warranty
of quiet enjoyment was breached by the defect in the premises,
resulting in the constructive eviction of the lessee, who vacated
the premises within a reasonable time after the breach; and (3)
under Higgins v. Whiting7" the covenant of quiet enjoyment and
the covenant to pay rent were mutually dependent, the breach of
one relieving the other party of the obligations of the other cove-
nant. The court discussed the closely connected nature of these
three concepts in the following way:
The inference to be drawn from the cases is that the remedy
of constructive eviction probably evolved from a desire by
the courts to relieve the tenant from the harsh burden im-
7 0See Section V infra.
71See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
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posed by common law rules which applied principles of caveat
emptor to the letting, rejected an implied warranty of habita-
bility, and ordinarily treated undertakings of the landlord in
a lease as independent covenants. To alleviate the tenant's
burden, the courts broadened the scope of the long-recognized
implied covenant of quiet enjoyment (apparently designed
originally to protect the tenant against ouster by a title su-
perior to that of his lessor) to include the right of the tenant
to have the beneficial enjoyment and use of the premises for
the agreed term. It was but a short step then to the rule that
when the landlord or someone acting for him or by virtue of
a right acquired through him causes a substantial interference
with that enjoyment and use, the tenant may claim a construc-
tive eviction. In our view, therefore, at the present time
whenever a tenant's right to vacate leased premises comes
into existence because he is deprived of their beneficial enjoy-
ment and use on account of acts chargeable to the landlord,
it is immaterial whether the right is expressed in terms of
breach of a covenant of quiet enjoyment, or material failure
of consideration or material breach of an implied warranty
against latent defectsY2
4. Implied Mutually Dependent Covenants
In almost all the cases discussed so far the covenants deemed
to be mutually dependent were specifically bargained for and con-
sidered to be important provisions by the parties to the lease. It is
not surprising that a majority of these cases revolve around com-
mercial leases because it is in this type of lease that the parties
most often stand at arm's length and bargain for the specific terms
of the lease in an attempt to obtain the best possible position in
the lease. It is in this type of lease that the view of holding only
those express covenants deemed to be vital enough to go to the
"whole consideration" of the lease to be mutually dependent has
worked the most satisfactorily. In the area of residential leases,
however, this approach has been highly criticized.7 3 Limiting the
doctrine of mutually dependent covenants to express covenants
results in the doctrine being applied primarily to commercial leases
because lessors' covenants are often not expressly bargained for in
residential leases. And, yet, residential lessors' covenants-per-
taining to: (1) services such as the furnishing of heat, hot water,
72251 A.2d at 276.
73Note, Contract Principles and Leases of Realty, 50 B. U. L. Rav. 24, at
28-29 (1970).
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sanitation services; (2) freedom from rodent and insect infesta-
tion; and (3) the condition and maintenance of structural im-
provements on the land-can be essential to the lessee's use and
enjoyment of the premises. A few jurisdictions are beginning to
recognize the problems inherent in this approach and are holding
that some covenants are so essential to a lease that they will be
implied in lease agreements and that the mutual dependency doc-
trine will be applied to these implied covenants. The subject of
implied warranties or covenants in leases generally is discussed
later ;74 therefore, the present discussion will revolve around the
application of the doctrine of mutual dependency to such covenants
and not around these covenants themselves.
The impetus behind the application of the mutual dependency
doctrine to implied covenants in leases stems from three sources:
(1) public policy in general; (2) housing codes; and (3) state
statutes. The source resorted to first was public policy. In Pines
v. Perssion" several law students leased a furnished house for
the school year from the owner. The premises leased turned out
to be in filthy and uninhabitable condition. After a brief attempt
to make the house habitable the lessees moved out and sued the
lessor for return of the rent deposit made on the house. The lessor
defended on the basis that there was no covenant in the lease that
the premises were suitable for habitation. The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin held that the lessees were absolved from any liability
for rent under the lease, their liability being limited to the reason-
able rental value of the premises during the time of actual occu-
pancy, and that they could recover their deposit on the basis that
public policy demanded the implication of a covenant of habita-
bility in this type of lease. The court went on to say: "Respon-
dent's [lessee's] covenant to pay rent and appellant's [lessor's]
covenant to provide a habitable house were mutually dependent,
and thus a breach of the latter by appellant relieved respondents
of any liability under the former. '76 It should be noted that al-
though the correct source of the implied covenant has been the
subject of some debate, i.e., whether it stems from public policy
or a well recognized exception to the general rule of caveat
74See Section V infra.
7514 Wis.2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
76d. 111 N.W.2d at 413.
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emptor7 7 there is no doubt that the court intended to apply the
mutual dependency doctrine to this covenant.
The New Jersey Supreme Court reached the same conclusion
recently in Marini v. Ireland.78 In this case the lessor leased an
apartment limited in use to dwelling purposes to the lessee who
soon discovered that the toilet had a crack and leaked. After un-
successful efforts to have the lessor repair, the lessee had the toilet
repaired himself, paid the bill and deducted the amount of the bill
from the rent he paid to the lessor. The lessor contested the
assertion that the repair bill should be deducted from the rent and
finally sued to dispossess the lessee for failure to pay rent due.
The lessee raised the defense that the failure of the lessor to repair
the defect constituted a breach of either the covenant of habitability
or the covenant of quiet enjoyment, giving him the right to self-
help. The court, in ruling that the lessee did have the right to
exercise this form of self-help, said that they need not consider
the question of a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, but,
rather, the question of breach of an implied covenant of habita-
bility. Because the purpose of the lease was to furnish a dwelling
suitable for living purposes, public policy demands that the lease
should, by implication, contain a covenant that there were no
latent defects at the commencement of the lease and that the prem-
ises would remain defect-free throughout the life of the lease.
Citing Higgins v. Whiting,79 the court stated that because the
covenant to pay rent should be considered dependent on the im-
plied covenant of habitability, a breach of the latter gives the
lessee the right either to repair the defect and deduct the amount
of the repair bill from the rent, or to vacate the premises and end
his obligations under the lease.
Marini was soon followed by Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown,80
which sheds light on how damages may be determined, assuming
the breach of a mutually dependent covenant. The lessor had
leased an apartment to the lessee in a multistoried apartment build-
ing. The lessee refused to pay the rent because of a lack of heat,
garbage disposal, and elevator service, along with defects in vene-
tian blinds, water leaks, wall cracks, and a lack of painting. The
7 7See Section V infra.
7856 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
7 9 See note 39 supra.
80111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970).
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lessor sued to dispossess the lessee for failure to pay the rent, and
the lessee defended on the basis that the rent should be diminished
twenty-five per cent (25%) because of the defects. The court
agreed with the lessee, relying on Marini and stating that the fol-
lowing principles of that case would be applicable to the present
case: (1) in a dispossess proceeding a lessee can raise the issue
of diminution in the amount of rent due by reason of the lessor's
failure to supply services; (2) a covenant that the premises "were
habitable and fit for living" would be implied in the lease because
indispensable in order to carry into effect the purpose of the lease;
and (3) the lessee's covenant to pay rent and the lessor's covenant
of habitability would be construed to be mutually dependent. The
court reached the conclusion that a failure to provide hot water,
garbage disposal or elevator service, being basic living require-
ments, would be deemed to be a breach of the implied covenant
of habitability; whereas, a malfunction of the venetian blinds,
water leaks and a lack of painting would be deemed to be a depri-
vation of "amenities" and would not constitute such a breach. On
the question of the amount of rent abatement allowable in such a
situation, the court admitted the difficulty of it because of the lack
of authority dealing with it, but relied on the Model Residential
Landlord-Tenant Code81 which provides for a twenty-five per cent
(25%) reduction in rent for failure to furnish hot water. This
approach has been commended as a practical and reasonable way
of determining the extent of rent abatement allowable without
resort to the expensive process of hiring an expert appraiser to
testify as to the amount of damages resulting from a given kind
and quantity of breach of the covenant of habitability. 2
One later New Jersey case interprets both Marini and Academy
Spires; it is Kruvant v. Sunrise Market, Inc.83 In this case a
lessor had leased commercial premises to the lessee by a lease
containing a provision that any controversy as to the amount of
rent owed should be settled by arbitration, and that, during arbi-
tration, the stated rent was to be paid. The lessee repaved a
parking lot which it claimed it was the lessor's obligation to do
81§ 2-207(1) (b) Amer. Bar Found. Tent. Draft 1969).
82Bross, Law Reform Man Meets the Slumlord: Interactions of New
Remedies and Old Buildings in Housing Code Enforcement, 3 THE URBAN
LAWYER 609, at 617 (1971).
83112 N.J. Super. 509, 271 A.2d 741 (1970).
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and, thereafter, refused to pay the full rent, claiming an offset of
the amount expended for repaving against the rent. The court
upheld the lessor's suit to dispossess the lessee for failure to pay
rent for two reasons. First, since the lease obligated the lessee
to pay rent during the arbitration of any dispute, it was obligated
to pay full rent during the present dispute. Second, the court
stated that the "doctrine" laid down in Marini and exended in
Academy Spires is not applicable to commercial leases, but only
residential leases. Two observations can be made of this decision:
(1) because of the specific obligations on the lessee in this com-
mercial lease, the decision should be limited to the specific facts;
and (2) if the court uses the term "doctrine" to refer to the rent
abatement technique found in both Marini and Academy Spires,
although it is true that they both dealt with residential leases, an
earlier New Jersey Supreme Court case, Reste Realty Corp. v.
Cooper,8 4 held the concept of mutual dependency applicable to a
covenant of habitability implied in a commercial lease. And the
technique of rent abatement, based on the Model Residential Land-
lord-Tenant Code, or some other device, is merely an application
of the concept of the mutual dependence of the lessor's covenant
of habitability and the lessee's covenant to pay rent.
A second source of the application of the mutual dependency
doctrine to implied covenants in leases is that of housing codes.
They are becoming recognized as objective criteria for a deter-
mination of whether or not premises are habitable. One leading
case adopting this approach is Javins v. First National Realty
Corp.85 A lessor was suing his residential lessee for possession of
the premises for nonpayment of rent. As a defense the lessee
offered evidence of numerous violations of the Housing Regula-
tions of the District of Columbia. The lower court ruled this evi-
dence inadmissible and ruled for the lessor. The circuit court re-
versed, holding that a warranty of habitabiilty, measured by the
standards set out in the Housing Regulations, is implied by law
into leases of urban dwelling units covered by the Regulations.
The court concluded by saying: "Under contract principles . ..
the tenant's obligation to pay rent is dependent upon the landlord's
84See note 69, supra.
85428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
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performance of his obligations, including his warranty to maintain
the premises in habitable condition.86
A second case reaching the same decision is Amanuensis, Ltd.
v. Brown.8 7 Here the lessor sought to evict a lessee for nonpay-
ment of rent. The lessor had purchased the building wherein the
lessee had his apartment on April 15, 1969, the building then
having violations of the New York City Housing Maintenance
Code assessed against it. The lessor took no steps to remove the
violations, but, rather, refused to repair pursuant to what the
court concluded was a scheme to force the remaining lessees to
move. The lessee defended the suit on the basis that the lessor had
breached warranties of fitness for use and quiet enjoyment. The
court held that the requirements of the Code and the New York
State Multiple Dwelling Law have created an implied warranty
of habitability which was breached by the lessor due to his failure
to exert a good-faith effort to remove substantial violations of the
Code in order to force his lessees to move. The court went on to
hold that "under accepted contract principles" the presence of
substantial violations wholly defeated a claim for rent.
A third source of the application of the mutual dependency
doctrine to implied covenants in leases is that of state statutes. The
chief example of this source is New York's so-called Spiegal
Law,88 whereby welfare authorities may withhold an indigent
lessee's rent from the lessor when there are conditions in the
building wherein the lessee's apartment is located that are danger-
ous to life or health. The Law provides that the welfare lessee
has a statutory defense in an action of eviction brought by the
lessor for nonpayment of rent, if at the time the action is com-
menced there exist such conditions in the building. In Schaeffer
v. Montes89 the lessor sued to evict the lessee for nonpayment of
rent due to the application of the Spiegal Law. The lessor claimed
the Law was unconstitutional; however, the court upheld its con-
stitutionality, concluding it does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The New York
Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the Law.90
86d. at 1082.
8765 Misc.2d 15, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1971).
88N.Y. Soc. Services Law § 143-6 (McKinney 1966).
8937 Misc.2d 722, 233 N.Y.S.2d 444 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1962).
90Farrell v. Drew, 19 N.Y.2d 486, 281 N.Y.S.2d 1, 227 N.E.2d 824 (1967).
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IV. ILLEGALITY OF CONTRACT DOCTRINE
One contract principle which has been historically applied to
real property leases falling into certain well-defined categories and
which has recently been revived to deal with urban residential
leases is that of illegality.9 1 An examination of the history and
the present use of this doctrine reveals how courts can utilize a
contractual principle in handling property leases.
A. Contract Principles
Illegality arises in the area of contracts when the bargain is in
violation of existing law, whether its source is (1) legislation,
(2) common law, or (3) prevailing mores of the community, i.e.,
public policy.9 2 As a general rule of contract law, a party to an
illegal bargain can neither recover damages for breach of the bar-
gain, nor recover the performance that he has rendered or its value
by rescinding the bargain. 93 There are, however, certain circum-
stances that justify recovery on such a contract; (1) recovery is
allowed to a party who is justifiably ignorant of all facts making
the bargain illegal ;94 (2) recovery is allowed to a party not as
equally guilty as the other party;95 and, (3) recovery is allowed
to a party for whose benefit the statute making the bargain illegal
was intended.9 6
A bargain may be illegal because it is in violation of law existing
at the time of its inception, or it may become illegal after its incep-
tion because of a change of fact or of law.97 The latter alternative
is known as "supervening illegality" and results in further per-
formance of the bargain becoming illegal. In the area of real prop-
erty leases the illegality of contract principle has been limited to
cases of the first type, i.e., where the law affecting the lease is in
91Although the designation "illegal contract" is often applied to this prin-
ciple, the broader designation of "illegal bargain" is more accurate because
the former term is contradictory except where performance is in some way
recognized as a duty. Since many illegal bargains create no change in legal
relations, they are void; however, some illegal bargains are enforceable by
at least one party, and, consequently, cannot be said to be void. See RE-
STATEMENT OF CONTACrs § 512, comment c (1932).
926A CORBIN § 1374.
9 3 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 598 (1932).
941d. § 599; 6A CORBIN § 1538.
9 5RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 604 (1932).
96d. § 601; 6A CORBIN § 1540.
9 7RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 608 (1932).
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existence at the time the lease is entered into. Cases wherein
the law affecting the lease comes into existence after entry into
the lease are decided on different principles.9"
B. Real Property Leases
1. Leases for Illegal or Immoral Purposes
It has long been the rule that where real property is leased with
the knowledge and intent of both parties that it is to be used for
illegal or immoral purposes, the lease is illegal, void and unen-
forceable.9 9 This rule has frequently been applied to leases where-
in the purpose was the unlawful sale of liquor. Dunn v. Stege-
mannU0° is a typical example. In this case the plaintiff-lessor
leased premises to the defendant-lessee by a lease containing a
provision limiting the lessee's use of the premises to that of a
saloon and cigar stand. At the time the lease was made San
Francisco, by ordinance, prohibited the operation of a saloon with-
out a license and prohibited the granting of a license where the
premises were located within 150 feet of a church. The premises
involved were located within 150 feet of a church. The lessor
sued the lessee for unpaid rent. The California Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's judgment for the lessor, holding that no
recovery can be had by either party to a "contract" having for its
object the violation of law. The court reasoned that the lease was
not enforceable because it was invalid.
The conduct of illegal gambling operations has been the basis
for holding a real property lease illegal, void and unenforceable.
In Ryan v. Potwinl ° 1 the lessor leased premises to the lessee,
knowing that they were to be used for gambling purposes. A state
statute made it a penal offense to so lease premises. When the
lessor sued the lessee for unpaid rent, the court held that the lessor
could not recover on such a lease.
A third illegal or immoral purpose which has caused a lease to
98SEce Sections V and VIII infra.
991 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.43.
10010 Cal. App. 38, 101 P. 25 (1909) ; accord, Musco v. Torello, 102 Conn.
346, 128 A. 645 (1925); Koepke v. Peper, 155 Iowa 687, 136 N.W. 902
(1912); Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. Burke, 135 Tenn. 19, 185 S.W.
704 (1916).
10162 Ill. App. 134 (1896); accord, Simpson v. Wood, 105 Mass. 263
(1870).
19721
BAYLOR LAW REVIEW
be declared illegal is that of prostitution. In Dougherty v. Sey-
mour10 2 the lessor leased premises to the lessee for the purpose
of operating a bawdyhouse. When the lessor sued the lessee to
collect unpaid rent the Colorado Supreme Court, upholding a trial
court determination in the lessee's favor, said: ". . . we have a
case in which both parties to the lease are shown to have entered
into the same with the understanding that the leased premises
were to be used for the purpose of prostitution. Such contracts,
being contra bones mores, cannot be enforced." 10 3
2. Leases Which Violate Zoning Ordinances
A second general category of leases which have consistently
been held to be illegal and, consequently, unenforceable is com-
posed of those which violate zoning ordinances. 0 4 The rule gov-
erning this type of case has been stated in the following way: "If
the parties knowingly enter into a lease pursuant to which the sole
use permitted by the landlord and intended to be pursued by the
tenant is a use prohibited by the zoning ordinances the contract is
for an illegal purpose and neither party may recover thereon."' 105
Several cases well illustrate the application of this rule. In
Howell v. City of Hamburg Co., 10 6 the plaintiff-lessor leased to
the defendant-lessee a one-story wooden building to be built on
a lot for a period of two years with the right to extend the lease
for three more years. At the time this lease was entered into San
Francisco, where the premises were located, had a fire ordinance
prohibiting the erection of wooden buildings within an area en-
compassing the premises covered by the lease. Upon the lessee's
failure to pay the rent stipulated in the lease, the lessor sued to
recover the rent. The California Supreme Court reversed the
trial court's judgment in the lessor's favor, saying that ". . . the
contract of lease was founded upon an unlawful consideration, and
10216 Colo. 289, 26 P. 823 (1891); accord, Campbell v. Gullo, 142 La.
1082, 78 So. 124 (1918); Rosenblath v. Sanders, 150 La. 882, 91 So. 252(1922); Berni v. Boyer, 90 Minn. 469, 97 N.W. 121 (1903); Mitchell v.
Campbell, 111 Miss. 806, 72 So. 231 (1916) ; Ashbrook v. Dale, 27 Mo. App.
649 (1887) ; Ernst v. Crosby, 140 N.Y. 364. 35 N.E. 603 (1893) ; Hunstock
v. Palmer, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 459, 23 S.W. 294 (1893).
10326 P. at 823.
1o4See generally Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 1018 (1971).
1053 A. Rathkopf, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 73-1 (3d ed.
1970).106165 Cal. 172, 131 P. 130 (1913).
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. . . the entire contract was therefore void and unenforceable."'107
In contrast to the last case, where the lessor was prevented from
enforcing the lease because of its illegality, in Ober v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co o108 the lessee was prevented from enforcing the
lease for the same reason. The defendant-lessor had leased the
premises to the plaintiff-lessee for the sole purpose of operating
a valet shop. Since the zoning ordinances which were in exist-
ence when the lease was executed prohibited such use in the area
where the property was located, the lessee vacated and sued the
lessor for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment contained in
the lease. The court ruled in favor of the lessor, relying on the
contract principle that a contract in violation of existing law can-
not be enforced.
A recent case dealing with this problem is Walker v. Southern
Trucking Corp.,10 9 where the lessor leased premises to the lessee
by a lease which provided that the property would be used as an
"office and warehouse and Trucking Terminal and for no other
different obje&t or purpose." The lessee expended $3,000 in pre-
paring the property for the contemplated use, not knowing the
property was zoned as a multiple-dwelling area. The city ordered
the lessee to discontinue its use in violation of the ordinance. Both
the lessor and lessee, who were ignorant of the zoning of the prop-
erty at the time the lease was executed, sought unsuccessfully to
have the zoning changed. The lessee vacated, whereupon the
lessor sued for unpaid rent and the lessee filed for recoupment for
$3,000 spent in preparation of the property. The Alabama Su-
preme Court upheld a judgment in favor of the lessee and allowed
recoupment in this case. The court, citing Ober, held that where
a lease permits the lessee to use premises for a single purpose, a
prohibition of law against such use annuls or terminates the "con-
tract" and relieves the lessee of any obligation thereunder.
3. Leases Which Violate Housing Codes
The illegality of contract principle has recently been taken out
of the traditional areas of application, in so far as leases are con-
cerned, and has been applied to urban residential leases which
1071d. at 176, 131 P. at 132.
108157 Misc. 869, 872, 284 N.Y.S. 966 (N.Y. City Ct. 1935).
109283 Ala. 551, 219 So.2d 379 (1965).
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substantially violate municipal housing codes. Courts in the Dis-
trict of Columbia have begun to utilize this principle as a means
of compensating residential lessees for the damages suffered from
substandard housing." 0 The application of this principle has al-
lowed complete or partial rent abatement and other relief to be
given to lessees.
The first case to adopt the illegality rule in this context was
Adams v. Lancaster.' The lessee sued her lessor to recover $80
paid as a rent advance under an oral contract to lease the prem-
ises. The lessee never went into possession but found more suit-
able housing and asked the lessor to return the $80. Upon the
lessor's refusal to return the money, the lessee sued for its return,
claiming that the lease was void because of the existence of housing
code violations at the time the lease was executed and because
the certificate of occupancy would not permit a family as large as
hers to occupy the premises. The court ruled in favor of the
lessee, holding that the lease was illegal and void and that the
lessee could recover the $80 paid to her lessor at the time the
lease was executed. Although the court did not state the reasons
for allowing the $80 recovery, exceptions to the general rule of
nonrecoverability on an illegal contract could be applied.
1
"
2
A short time later Brown v. Southall Realty Co." 3 was de-
cided, The lessor sued the lessee for possession for nonpayment
of rent. The trial court awarded judgment to the lessor. The
lessee appealed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, al-
though she had previously moved from the premises, on the basis
that the judgment of the trial court would render certain facts
res judicata in any subsequent action for rent; the Court of Ap-
peals agreed. At the time the lease was entered into the lessor
knew that certain housing code violations existed-obstructed
commode, broken railing, insufficient ceiling height in basement-
which prevented it from being used as a dwelling place. The lessee
defended on the basis that no rent was due under the lease because
it was an illegal contract, being in contravention of the District
llOSee Daniels, Judicial and Legislative Remedies for Substandard Hous-
ing: Landlord-Tenant Reform in the District of Columbia, 59 GEo. L.J. 909
(1971).
11 Small Claims No. C-12912-67 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess., Oct. 25, 1967),
reprinted in LAW IN ACTION, Nov. 1967, at 14.112See notes 94, 95 and 96 supra and accompanying text.
113237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1018 (1969).
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of Columbia Housing Regulations, the pertinent parts of which
are as follows:
§ 2304 - No person shall rent or offer to rent any habitation,
or the furnishings thereof, unless such habitation and its fur-
nishings are in a clean, safe and sanitary condition, in repair,
and free from rodents or vermin.
§ 2501- Every premises accommodating one or more habi-
tations shall be maintained and kept in repair so as to provide
decent living accommodations for the occupants. This part of
the Code contemplates more than mere basic repairs and main-
tenance to keep out the elements; its purpose is to include re-
pairs and maintenance to make a premises or neighborhood
healthy and safe.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment for the
lessor. The court concluded that because the violations were such
as to make the habitation unsafe and unsanitary (§ 2304) and
because the premises had not been maintained to the degree neces-
sary to keep them healthy and safe (§ 2501), the lease was in
violation of the Housing Regulations. The court stated that the
general rule governing contracts is that ". . . an illegal contract,
made in violation of the statutory prohibition designed for police
or regulatory purposes, is void and confers no right upon the
wrongdoer," and that there was no reason to treat a lease differ-
ently from any other contract in this regard.
Although not stressing the point, the court in Brown did find
that the violations of the housing code were substantial. Housing
codes themselves should be consulted to determine what type of
violation will make a lease illegal. Courts need to exercise dis-
cretion and find illegality only where the violations are substantial
enough to thwart the purpose of the housing code to maintain a
healthy and safe dwelling.114 Reese v. Diamond Housing Corp.115
illustrates this approach. The lessee defended a suit brought by
the lessor for possession of the premises for nonpayment of rent
on the basis that the lease was void and unenforceable because
violations of the District of Columbia Housing Regulations exist-
114See Note, Leases and the Illegal Contract Theory-Judicial Reinforce-
ment of the Housing Code, 56 GEo. L.J. 920, 929-30 (1968); U. PiTT. L.
REv, 134, 126-37 (1968).
115259 A.2d 112 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).
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ing when the lease was executed made it an illegal agreement. The
trial court found that the violations were not of the quality and
kind sufficient to render the premises unsafe and unsanitary. The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld this determination
on the basis that the evidence supported the decision that any
housing code violations which existed at the inception of the lease
did not substantially affect habitability, and, consequently, relieve
the lessee of his obligation to pay the rent.
Diamond Housing Corp. v. Robinson'1 6 deals with the problem
of the lessor's knowledge of the existence of housing code viola-
tions on the premises when he leases them and also with the prob-
lem of the effect of substantial violations on the lease. The lessor
sued the lessee for possession of the premises for nonpayment of
rent. The lessee defended on the basis that the lease was void
and unenforceable because it was illegal due to violations of the
Housing Regulations in existence at the time the lease was exe-
cuted. The lessor argued that Brown was not applicable because
at the time the lease was signed he had not received official notice
of the existence of the violations from the city's housing inspectors.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that violations
of the Housing Regulations may exist even though city inspectors
have not inspected the premises and cited the defective conditions,
and, therefore, Brown was applicable. The court also held that
when it is established that a lease is void and unenforceable under
Brown, the lessee becomes a tenant at sufferance and the tenancy
may be terminated on thirty days notice.
The lessee's victory in Robinson is a Pyrrhic one if the lessor
can immediately terminate the lease pursuant to thirty days notice
because the illegality of the lease transforms the lessee into a ten-
ant at sufferance. The lessor can accomplish by one method what
he cannot accomplish by another. The lessee may have some
defense in such a situation, but only if he can prove that the
eviction by the lessor was in retaliation for some act of the lessee
such as reporting housing code violations, making complaints to
the lessor, joining a tenant union, or withholding rent. Although
the subject of retaliatory eviction is beyond the scope of this
paper117 it should be pointed out that the District of Columbia
116257 A.2d 492 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).117See generally 21 SYRACUsE L. REv. 986 (1970); 54 MARg. L. REv. 239
(1971).
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Landlord-Tenant Regulations now protect a lessee who is with-
holding rent because of housing code violations against a retalia-
tory eviction by the lessor. 118 But this is far from complete pro-
tection to the lessee because the lessor can still terminate the lease
for any legitimate reason or for no reason at all. 119 There is the
additional factor of the lessor increasing the lessee's rent within
this context for either legitimate or illegitimate reasons. 120 Thus,
the illegality principle that is beginning to be applied to leases
may prove to be a boon to the lessee more in the form of protec-
tion against past-due rent than in allowing him to maintain pos-
session of the property.
William J. Davis, Inc. v. Slade' 12 deals with the question of
what compensation, if any, the lessor is entitled to receive from
his lessee for the use and occupancy of the premises when the
lease is declared to be void and illegal because of the existence
of housing code violations. The defendant-lessor had leased prem-
ises to the plaintiff-lessee at a time when the lessor knew of sub-
stantial code violations. The lessor had sued the lessee for pos-
session of the premises for nonpayment of rent, but the suit failed
because the lease was void under the ruling in Brown. The lessee
then sued the lessor in the present action to recover the amount
of rent ($690) paid to the lessor under the void lease. The lessor
argued that it was entitled to keep the rent because it and the
lessee were in pari delicto, and, consequently, the court should
leave the parties where it finds them, i.e., with the lessor having
the $690. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals declined
to follow this view, and, instead, held that the lessor was entitled
only to the reasonable value of the premises in the condition they
were in when occupied by the lessee. The court reasoned that
the parties were not in pari delicto because the existing housing
shortage in the District of Columbia, which the parties stipulated
to and the court took judicial notice of, prevented there being any
true bargaining power by the lessee to bargain for premises free
from code violations. Since the lease was void ab initio, the lessee
was a tenant at sufferance in the District of Columbia; therefore,
the general rule denying quasi-contractual relief should not be
118See Daniels, supra note 110, at 940.
119See Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wisc.2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970).
12OSee 54 MARQ. L. REV. 239, at 243.
121271 A.2d 412 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970).
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followed but, rather, the lessor should receive from the lessee what
a tenant at sufferance owes-the reasonable value of the premises
in the condition they were in when occupied.
Cooks v. Fowler122 presents some of the procedural problems
surrounding the application of the illegality principle to leases.
The lessor sued the lessee for possession of the premises for non-
payment of rent; the lessee defended on the basis that the lease
was void under Brown because of the existence of known code
violations when the lease was executed. The lessor then brought
a second action for possession based on proper notice to quit, i.e.,
the lessor treated the lessee as a tenant at sufferance and gave
thirty days notice to quit; the lessee defended on the basis that the
notice to quit was retaliatory. The jury found substantial code
violations, but no retaliatory motive. Judgment was rendered for
the lessor, but the court granted a stay of execution of the judg-
ment, pending the lessee's appeal of the judgment that the notice
to quit was not retaliatory, conditioned, however, on the lessee's
depositing into court sums equal to the monthly rental under the
lease. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals denied the
lessee's appeal for reversal of this condition. However, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
that the condition ignored the jury's finding that there were sub-
stantial code violations and also held that it required standard
rent for substandard housing. Therefore, the condition was modi-
fied to require the lessee to deposit in court the reasonable occu-
pancy value of the premises in the "as is" condition.
Watson v. Kotler123 points up the fact that the lessor who
promptly repairs housing code violations has nothing to fear from
the illegality principle. The lessor sued the lessee for possession
of the premises for nonpayment of rent; the lessee defended on
the basis that there were housing code violations cited on the
premises at the time the lease was executed. The violations were
cited on June 23, 1967; on reinspection in September, 1967, the
housing inspector found that the violations had been abated. Dur-
ing the period between these two inspections the lessor had leased
the p'emises to the lessee. The court ruled that the fact that there
had been violations, which were being corrected, on the premises
122437 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
-232T-A.2d 141 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970).
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at the time the lease was executed did not render the lease void
because the purpose of the Housing Regulations was not solely to
penalize lessors, but to stimulate them into keeping the premises
safe and habitable for lessees.
Saunders v. First National Realty Corp.124 deals with the effect
of housing code violations arising after entry into the lease. When
the lessor sued the lessee for possession of the premises for non-
payment of rent, the lessee defended on the basis that numerous
housing code violations arose during the lease that ended the
lessee's obligation to pay rent. The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals upheld the trial court's judgment in the lessor's favor,
refusing to hold that violations occurring after the tenancy is
created void the lease. This decision was reversed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, who
shifted the basis of decision from that of illegality to that of implied
warranty of habitability.
There are two Illinois appellate court decisions which indicate
that Illinois will apply the illegality of contract doctrine to leases.
In Heineck v. Grosse125 the lessor leased to the lessee a portion
of land under a sidewalk and a portion of the sidewalk directly
above for a term of five years. The lessee occupied these premises
for four and one-half years and then vacated, whereupon the lessor
sued to collect rent for the last six months of the term. A City of
Chicago ordinance prohibited the occupancy of part of a sidewalk
for private purposes. The appellate court reversed the trial court's
judgment for the lessor, holding ". . . the lease is in direct vio-
lation, so far as it provides for the occupancy of a portion of the
sidewalk, of the municipal ordinances above set out, and is there-
fore invalid. Being invalid as to part of the lease, because of its
violation of the city ordinances, it cannot be the basis of a recovery
in this suit."12 6
Longenecker v. Hardin127 relied on both Heineck and Brown v.
Southall Realty Co.128 in reaching a decision based on the illegality
of contract doctrine. The lessor sued the lessee for unpaid rent
124245 A.2d 836 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968), rev'd sub. nora.; Javins v.. First
National Realty Corp. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400
U.S. 925 (1970).
12599 Il. App. 441 (1902).
1261d. at 444.
127264 N.E.2d 878 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970).128See note 113 supra.
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and the lessee raised the defense that the lease was invalid and
unenforceable under the following provisions of the Municipal Code
of the City of Chicago:
§ 78-13. No person shall occupy as owner-occupant, nor
shall any person let or hold out to another for occupancy, any
dwelling or family dwelling unit which does not comply with
the requirements of sections 78-13.1 through 78-13.12 of this
chapter.
§ 78-17. No person shall occupy as owner-occupant or shall
let or hold out to another for occupancy any dwelling or fam-
ily unit, for the purpose of living therein, which is not safe,
clean, sanitary and fit for human occupancy, and which does
not comply with the particular requirements of sections
78-17.1 through 78.17.8 of this chapter.
The lessee alleged numerous violations of these sections. The trial
court struck this affirmative defense; the appellate court held this
to be reversible error. The lessor argued that the lessee's affirma-
tive defense should be stricken for two reasons: (1) the lessee
was precluded by a provision in the lease from asserting violations
of the Code; and (2) such alleged violations would not relieve a
lessee from the obligation to pay rent so long as he remained in
possession. The appellate court refused to adopt this view, first,
because the lease provision relied on by the lessor ".... cannot pre-
clude the interposition of the doctrine of illegality of the lease ;"
and second, because the lessee's defense was not based on con-
structive eviction, which the lessor's argument was directed to-
ward, but was based on the illegality of the lease under the Code.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has recently refused to extend
the illegality of contract doctrine to leases. In Posnanski v.
Hood1 29 the lessor sued the lessee to recover unpaid rent and the
lessee defended on the basis that serious violations of the Milwau-
kee Housing Code existed before and after the lease was executed
which rendered the lease illegal and void. The trial court rejected
the lessee's evidence of such violations, and the Supreme Court
upheld this action, stating that the lessee did not have an affirma-
tive defense based on violations of the Code, and, consequently,
the trial court did not commit error in refusing to admit evidence
12946 Wisc2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970).
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based on that contention. The court reasoned that the intent of
the legislation creating the Code was to make the commissioner
of health the enforcing agency of the Code and not an individual
lessee, and, also, that holding a lease void for violating the Code
would circumvent the existing enforcement procedures.
V. IMPLIED WARRANTY OF QUALITY
The issue that is receiving perhaps the most attention today in
the area of real property leases is whether a warranty of quality-
that the premises are habitable and fit for the purpose intended by
the parties-should be implied in such leases. To imply such a
warranty would alter the common law concept of the nature and
functions of a lease.
A. General Rule - Caveat Emptor
It has long been the rule that there is no covenant or warranty
implied in a lease that the premises are tenantable, habitable or
fit for the purpose for which they are leased. 130 The basis of this
rule is one already discussed :131 A lease is a conveyance of realty
for a term and subject to the same rule applied to freehold inter-
ests-that a conveyance does not carry with it an implied war-
ranty of fitness and habitability.1 32 This doctrine is predicated on
the theory that all the parties to the transaction have an equal
opportunity to acquire information and knowledge of the condition
of the premises, and, consequently, no affirmative duty to inform
regarding defects exists. 133 The parties, under this doctrine, can
protect themselves by prior inspection and express warranties. It
is apparent why, under this doctrine, the chief exception concerns
defects which the lessor knows about or should know about which
he fails to disclose to the lessee and which are not discoverable
by a reasonable inspection.134
As is true with so many of the common law rules surrounding
leases, the doctrine of caveat emptor arose when many leases were
of an agricultural nature, and the land itself was the most impor-
1301 Tiffany § 99; 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45.
131 See Section II-A-3 supra.
1321 Tiffany § 81.
133See 2 ST. MARY'S L.J. 106 (1970).
1341 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45, at 269.
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tant element and there were few, if any, structures on the land,
making it a relatively simple task for the lessee to determine for
himself the condition of the premises and their suitability for his
purpose.
B. Presently Recognized Exceptions to the General Rule
However, the law did not refuse to imply a warranty of quality
or another type of warranty when the need for such warranty was
evident. For example, there are two situations in which courts
have consistently implied a warranty that the premises are habit-
able and fit for the purpose intended. First, where there is the
leasing of furnished premises for a short term, such a warranty
is implied.1 35 The reason for this exception is that the parties
contemplate an immediate possession of the premises without time
for the lessee to inspect or put them in a tenantable condition.
Second, where there is the leasing of premises within a building
not yet completed when the lease is made, such a warranty is
implied.13 6 The reason here is that since the premises are not yet
completed, the lessee cannot inspect and determine for himself
if they are suitable.
The concept of implied warranty, then, is not completely foreign
to leases. And there are other warranties that are implied in leases.
First, a warranty of quiet enjoyment-that the lessee's possession
will not be disturbed by an act of the lessor or by one acting under
the lessor's authority or under paramount title-is implied in the
lease because of the relationship of the parties.137 This implied
covenant points up the common law's concern over the physical
possession of the premises by the lessee. The use of the doctrine
of constructive eviction together with the covenant of quiet enjoy-
ment demonstrate the law's attempt to deal with the problem of
enjoyment of, rather than mere possession of, the premises on a
property basis, rather than a contractual basis.138 Second, from
a use of the words "demise" or "grant" or the equivalent in a
135Id. at 267-68; Smith v. Marrable, 11 M. & W. 6, 152 Eng. Rep. 693
(Ex. 1843).
136Young Corp. v. McClintic, 26 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933),
rev'd on other grounds, 66 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933); Skillern,
Implied Warranties in Leases: The Need for Change, 44 DENVER L.J. 387,
392-93 (1967).
1371 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.47.
138See Section III-B-3 supra.
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lease, the law implies a covenant of power to demise, with some
cases indicating that the covenant will be implied without refer-
ence to any particular language. 139 This covenant also demon-
strates the law's concern over possession of the demised property.
Third, the implied covenant to deliver possession, whereby the
entry into the lease implies a promise by the lessor to deliver legal
and, in some jurisdictions, actual possession to the lessee at the
commencement of the term, demonstrates the law's concern over
possession of the premises. 140 Fourth, on the lessee's part, the
entry into a lease whereby the rental is reserved in terms of a
percentage of gross sales or net profits, usually with a flat min-
imum rental below the present rental value, implies a covenant
by the lessee to occupy and use the property, to use reasonable
diligence to operate the business in such a manner as to produce
profits, and not to assign or sublease the leasehold without the
lessor's consent. 141
C. Departure from Caveat Emptor in Other Areas
1. Sales of Personalty
There has been a trend away from the rule of caveat emptor in
other types of transactions which has had an impact on the law
of real property leases. The most noteworthy example of this
trend is in the area of chattel sales. One avenue of approach that
the judiciary has taken to the problem of defective goods is that
of implying a warranty of quality. 142 A warranty, in this context,
is a statement or representation made by the seller of goods con-
temporaneously with, and as a part of, the contract of sale, having
reference to the quality of the goods, whereby he promises that
certain facts are as he represents them.143 The warranty will be
express when it is imposed by the parties to the contract; it is
1391 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.46; 1 Tiffany § 90.
1401 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.37; 1 Tiffany § 95.
1411 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.66.
142See James, Products Liability, 34 TEX. L. REv. 192 (1955) ; Kessler,
The Protection of the Consumer Under Modern Sales Law (pt. 1), 74 YALE
L.J. 262 (1964) ; Comment, The Application of the Doctrine of Unconscion-
ability to Warranties: A Move Toward Strict Liability Within the U.C.C.,
38 FoRD. L. REv. 73 (1969).
143Jaeger, Products Liability: The Constructive Warranty, 39 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 501, 506 (1964).
1972]
BAYLOR LAW REVIEW
implied when it is imposed by law. The implied warranty is a
curious mixture:
A more notable example of legal miscegenation could hardly
be cited than that which produced the modern action for
breach of warranty. Originally sounding in tort, yet arising
out of the warrantor's consent to be bound, it later ceased
necessarily to be consensual, and at the same time came to
lie mainly in contract.144
Today, the implied warranty of fitness or merchantability in chattel
sales is imposed by law independent of any contractual agree-
ment.' 45 The contractual warranty faced a number of problems at
the outset: (1) necessity of giving notice of a breach within a
reasonable time; (2) disclaimer of warranty by the seller, and
(3) privity between the plaintiff and defendant. 146 This "contract
mask" has led to unsatisfactory results and caused many courts
to turn to the alternative of strict liability. 147 Under this theory
the prime question is whether the goods are defective, rather than
whether they fail to conform to the warranty the law imputes to
the seller. This theory remedies the major limitations of the war-
ranty theory by dispensing with the requirement of privity and
precludes the possibility of disclaimer of liability.148 However,
there are restrictions in the application of the strict liability doc-
trine limiting its usefulness.' 49
The utilization of the warranties of merchantable quality and
fitness for a particular purpose in the Uniform Commercial Code'50
has had a large impact on the law of sales. However the Code
makes express provision for the limitation of damages for breach
of warranty, 151 for the limitation and exclusion of remedies,
152
and for the exclusion of warranties entirely.'53 These limitations
direct the Code toward a contractual form of warranty with its
14442 HARV. L. REv. at 414 (1929).
14SProsser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1126-27 (1960).
1461d. at 1127-33.
147id. at 1134.
148Note, Contract Principles and Leases of Realty, 50 B.U. LAW REv. 24,
36 (1970).
1491d.
150§ 2-314, 2-315.
151§ 2-719(3).
152§ 2-719(1) (a).
153§ 2-316,
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accompanying limitations. But it has been suggested that the
doctrine of unconscionability' 5 4 prevents the Code from being en-
tirely contract-oriented in its approach and gives it the capacity
for moving in the direction of strict liability. 55
2. Policy Considerations
The policy considerations behind the imposition of an implied
warranty of quality in chattel-sales cases have been argued to be
just as appicable to the leasing of real property because of the
fact that a modern lease is a "sale" of space and services analogous
to the "sale" of a "product."' 1 6 First, the risk of loss due to defects
in the product should be shifted to the seller because he is best
able to disperse the loss by adding his risk to the cost of doing
business and adjusting his prices accordingly. This process works
better when applied to a mass-producer than to a small-scale lessor
because of the problems of profit margins and rent control.'5 7 But,
whether the lessor is engaged in a large-scale or small-scale enter-
prise, he is generally more able to absorb the loss arising from
defects in the premises than is the lessee.' 58 Second, a manufac-
turer, by placing his product on the market and advertising it,
represents its quality and should bear responsibility for its defects.
Likewise, a lessor, in placing premises in the rental housing mar-
ket, represents that they are habitable and will continue to be so
during the tenancy and should bear responsibility for their non-
habitability.' 5 9 Third, a buyer cannot judge for himself whether
a product conforms to representations impliedly made by the seller,
but, rather, relies on the seller's superior skill and knowledge.
Likewise, the urban; residential lessee cannot judge for himself
the quality of the premises (electricity, plumbing, structural
soundness, services provided, etc.), but must rely on the lessor's
superior knowledge concerning these factors.' 60 Fourth, a war-
154§ 2-302, 2-719.
'
5 5 See Comment,.supra note 103.
'
5 6See Note, supra note 109, at 36-39.157See Gribetz & Grad, Housinq Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Rem-
edies, 66 COLUM. L. Rgv. 1254, 1271-72 (1966) ; Sax & Hiestand, Slumlord-
ism.as a Tort, 65 MicH. L. Rrv. 869 (1967); Comment, A Contract Rem-
edy for the Slum Dweller, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 499, 509-510.
1S8See Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
1591d.
16Dld.
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ranty of quality should be implied because the unequal bargaining
position between buyer and seller makes it virtually impossible for
a buyer to bargain for the inclusion of warranties in the contract
of sale. Likewise, today, in many urban areas, there is a housing
shortage, especially in low-income housing, that creates a "land-
lord's market," forcing the lessee to enter into a form lease on
the lessor's terms.161
3. Leases of Personalty
Although the concept of implied warranty has been applied
mainly to chattel sales, there are indications that it may expand to
chattel leases as well. Where the same policy considerations justi-
fying the imposition of this standard on the seller are present, the
implied warranties found at common law and in the Uniform Com-
mercial Code should be applied to nonsales cases. 162 Courts have
taken two approaches to this problem: (1) treating the lease
transaction essentially as a sale so as to apply the sales warranty
directly, and (2) applying the law of sales warranties by analogy
to lease transactions. 163 The Code recognizes the possibility of
applying implied warranty to nonsales cases:
[T}he warranty sections of this Article are not designed in
any way to disturb those lines of case law growth which have
recognized that warranties need not be confined either to sales
contracts or to the direct parties to such a contract. 64
The leading case in this regard is Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leas-
ing'65 where the defendant-lessor had leased several trucks to the
16 11n the District of Columbia, low vacancy rates force low-income les-
sees to occupy the same premises, regardless of their condition. In 1968, the
vacancy rate for apartments was 28%, compared to the 1966 rate of 3.3%.
See FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION ANALYSIS OF WASHINGTON, D.C.-
MARYLAND-VIRGINiA HOUSING MARKET 18 (1969). In Colorado, "[tihe
lack of available low-income housing is reflected in the low vacancy rate in
the Denver Housing Authority's units. The vacancy rate is only 0.05%...."
Comment, Housing the Poor: A Study of the Landlord-Tenant Relation-
ship, 41 U. CoLo. L. REV. at 542 n.6 (1969).162See Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases,
57 COLUM. L. Rzv. 653 (1957).1635ee Comment, Implied Warranties of Quality: Protection in Chattel
Leases, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 115.
164§ 2-313, Comment 2.
16545 NJ. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965); accord, Dore v. Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co., 180 S.2d 434 (La. Ct. App. 1965) ; Hoffman v. Misericor-
dia Hospital of Philadelphia, 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970).
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plaintiff's employer under a long-term contract whereby the de-
fendant was to repair and maintain the trucks. The plaintiff was
injured while riding in one of the trucks when the brakes failed.
The plaintiff sued the defendant on the basis of breach of an
implied warranty that the vehicle was fit and safe to use. The
New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision to
dismiss this warranty claim, holding that the contract for the leas-
ing and use of the truck gave rise to an implied warranty that it
is fit for the use contemplated by the plaintiff's employer. The
court said:
There is no good reason for restricting such warranties [of
fitness for use] to sales. Warranties of fitness are regarded
by law as an incident of a transaction because one party to
the relationship is in a better position than the other to know
and control the condition of the chattel transferred and to dis-
tribute the losses which may occur because of a dangerous
condition the chattel possesses. 166
What is said in this case concerning the position of the seller to
know of and control defects in the product is as applicable to
leases of realty as to leases of personalty.
4. Sales of Realty
Although caveat emptor has been the rule consistently applied
to the sale of real property, 167 there are cases which evidence a
trend away from this rule in this area in recent years. There are
three periods of time connected with the sale of realty which are
important in this regard: (1) Period I: contract of sale executed
before comencement of improvements on the property; (2) Period
II: contract of sale executed between the time of commencement
of improvements on the property and the time of completion of
the improvements; and (3) Period III: contract of sale executed
after completion of improvements on the property.1 68 Hoye v.
Century Builders, Inc.169 is a prominent example of a Period I,
or custom-built house, case in which the theory of implied war-
166212 A.2d at 775.
1673 AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.20.
16SSee Young & Harper, Quaere: Caveat Emptor or Caveat VJenditory?,
24 ARK. L. REv. 245 (1970).
16952 Wash.2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958).
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ranty of habitability was utilized. The plaintiff-vendee made an
on-site visit to a subdivision, and, accompanied by a salesman of
the defendant-builder-vendor, selected a lot, chose a set of plans
and contracted to buy the lot upon which the defendant was to
build the house before commencement of construction. When the
plaintiff sued the defendant on an implied warranty of habitability,
the Washington Supreme Court upheld the trial court's determina-
tion that in such a case, the doctrine of caveat emptor does not
apply, but, rather, there was in the contract an implied warranty
that the completed house would be fit for habitation.
Much of the reported litigation in this area has fallen into the
Period II category and Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd.170 was
the spawner of this litigation. In that case the plaintiff-vendee
visited a subdivision, viewed a model home and signed a contract
to purchase a house still in the process of construction. When the
house later proved to be uninhabitable due to dampness, the plain-
tiff sued the defendant-vendor for breach of contract, claiming a
breach of an implied warranty that the defendant would complete
the house in a good and workmanlike manner with materials of
good quality. The court, drawing a careful distinction between
the contract to purchase a finished house and the contract to pur-
chase an unfinished house, said that in the latter situation "...
there is an implication of law that the house shall be reasonably
fit for the purpose for which it is required, that is, for human
dwelling." 171 American cases have adopted this "unfinished house"
doctrine on the basic policy ground that it is impossible for the
buyer to inspect the premises for defects before construction is
complete. 172 Notice the similarity in reasoning in this approach
and the approach taken in a situation involving the leasing of
space within a building not yet completed, discussed earlier."7
3
Recently there have been several cases falling into Period III
wherein the court has implied a warranty of habitability into the
'70[1931] 2 K.B. 113.
171Id. at 121.
172Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963); Belhlahmy
v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1968); Weck v. A:M Sunrise Con-
struction Co., 36 I1. App2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1962) ; Vanderschrier v.
Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E2d 819 (1957) ; Jones v. Gatewood, 381
P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963).
173See note 97, supra, and accompanying text.
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contract of sale between a builder-vendor and the first vendee. 174
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons175 expresses best the policy behind this
departure from the general rule:
Caveat emptor developed when the buyer and seller were in
an equal bargaining position and they could readily be expect-
ed to protect themselves in the deed. Buyers of mass pro-
duced development homes are not on an equal footing with
the builder-vendors and are no more able to protect them-
selves in the deed than are automobile purchasers in a posi-
tion to protect themselves in the bill of sale. 176
This type of language is echoed in recent cases involving the lease
of realty wherein the argument has been raised that a warranty of
quality should be implied, so let us now turn our attention to the
movement away from the doctrine of caveat emptor in the lease-
hold field.
D. Implied Warranty of Quality in Real Property Leases
Three different sources have caused some departure from the
doctrine of caveat emptor and given rise to an implied warranty
of quality in real property leases. These sources are: (1) public
policy, whether derived from state or local legislation or from
contemporary conditions in the community; (2) state statutes
which impose a warranty of quality, either directly or indirectly,
in leases; and (3) municipal housing codes which impose a war-
ranty of quality, either directly or indirectly, in leases.
1. Effect of Public Policy
Several cases have relied on public policy, rather than specific
legislation, to imply a warranty of quality in leases. This aspect
of a number of cases discussed earlier 177 played a prominent part
in the courts' decisions. In Pines v. Perssion178 the Wisconsin
174Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1971); Carpenter
v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964) ; Schipper v. Levitt & Sons,
44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Waggoner v. Midwestern Development
Co., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d
554 (Tex. 1968) ; House v. Thornton, 76 Wash.2d 398, 457 P.2d 199 (1969).
17544 NJ. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
1761d. 207 A.2d at 326.
177See Section III supra.
17814 Wisc.2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961) ; see Section III, note 75 supra.
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Supreme Court used the following language in departing from the
doctrine of caveat emptor and implying a warranty of habitability
in a one-year residential lease of furnished premises:
Legislation and administrative rules, such as the safeplace
statute, building codes and health regulations, all impose cer-
tain duties on a property owner with respect to the condition
of his premises. Thus, the legislature has made a policy judg-
ment-that it is socially (and politically) desirable to impose
these duties on a property owner-which has rendered the old
common law rule obsolete. To follow the old rule of no im-
plied warranty of habitability in leases would, in our opinion,
be inconsistent with the current legislative policy concerning
housing standards. The need and social desirability of ade-
quate housing for people in this era of rapid population in-
creases is too important to be rebuffed by that obnoxious
legal cliche, caveat emptor.179
The court also discussed the well-recognized exception to the
caveat emptor doctrine pertaining to the leasing of furnished
premises for a short term, into which this case could fall. The
importance of the case in the present context is weakened by the
failure of the court to clearly state whether the basis of their
decision was one or both of these principles. The remedies to
which the lessees were entitled were rescission of the lease and a
reduction of the rent for the time of their actual occupancy to
the reasonable rental value of the premises.
There is no such doubt, however, surrounding Reste Realty
Corp. v. Cooper,80 where the use and enjoyment of the premises
by the lessee was interfered with by a defect in them. The New
Jersey Supreme Court held that the lessee, who had vacated the
premises, was not liable for the unpaid rent because there was a
breach of a warranty implied in the lease that no latent defects
existed on the premises or outside the premises. The court gave
the following reasons for not applying the caveat emptor doctrine:
(1) there is an inequality of bargaining power between the lessor
and lessee in many cases today, and (2) the lessee does not ordi-
narily have as much knowledge of the condition of the premises
as the lessor. The court pointed out that building code require-
179111 N.W.2d at 412-13.
18053 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969) ; see Section III, note 69 supra.
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ments and violations are made known to the lessor, not the lessee,
and that the lessor is in a better position to know of the existence
of latent defects, structural or otherwise, than the lessee who rarely
has the knowledge or expertise to see or discover them.
The affirmative remedy of terminaitng the cause of constructive
eviction, rather than the right to vacate pursuant to a rescission
of the lease, was given to the lessee in Marini v. Ireland.181 When
the lessor failed to repair a defective toilet, the lessee had it re-
paired and deducted the cost from her rent, whereupon the lessor
sued for possession for nonpayment of rent. The New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the lessee had a right to have the repair
made under the circumstances of the case and deduct the cost from
future rents on the basis that, ". . . the landlord should, in resi-
dential letting, be held to an implied covenant against latent de-
fects, which is another way of saying, habitabiilty and livability
fitness."182 The court referred to "these present days of housing
shortage" as a reason for allowing the lessee to exercise an affirma-
tive remedy instead of the remedy of rescission of the lease and
vacation of the premises.
In Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown 83 the court allowed a rent
abatement to the lessee according to a schedule set up in the
Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code 84 because of the lessor's
failure to provide heat, hot water, garbage disposal service and
elevator service. The court relied on the theory that a covenant
of habitability was implied in the lease, a breach of which allowed
a percentage reduction in the rent. The court took judicial notice
of the housing shortage in the area where the premises were
located in reaching its decision to allow a percentage rent reduc-
tion, rather than require vacation of the premises in order to work
a rescission of the lease.
2. Effect of State Statutes
A number of state legislatures have recognized the problems
surrounding the habitabiilty of leased residential premises and
have attempted, with varying success, to alleviate them in a va-
18156 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970) ; see Section III, note 78 supra.
182 d. 265 A.2d at 534.
183111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556; see Section II, note 80 supra.
184§2-207(1) (b) (Amer. Bar Found. Tent. Draft 1969).
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riety of ways. The most popular approach has been the so-called
"repair and deduct" statutes adopted in five states.185 Generally,
these statutes provide that the lessor of a building intended for
human occupation must put it into a condition fit for such use and
repair all subsequent dilapidations not occasioned by the lessee's
own negligence. If the lessor fails to repair within a reasonable
time after notice of dilapidations is given to him by the lessee, the
lessee has a choice of remedies: (1) he may repair the dilapida-
tions himself and deduct the cost from the rent, or (2) he may
vacate the premises and be discharged from any further obligation
under the lease. However, these statutes have been of limited
effectiveness because: (1) some limit the cost of repairs deduct-
ible to one month's rent,18 6 which may not cover the cost of major
defects which cause the premises to be uninhabitable; and
(2) they all expressly permit the lessor to contract away his
statutory obligation, a fact that could render the statute useless in
an area where housing shortages force lessees to lease on the
lessors' terms. Also, the statutes have been interpreted to limit
the lessee to the statutory remedies,18 7 rather than allowing the
more flexible contract remedies of rescission, reformation and
specific performance.
A second approach taken has been in the form of "rent abate-
ment" statutes found in three states.188 The Pennsylvania statute
serves as a good example of the operation of this type of statute.18 9
In Pennsylvania for a dwelling to qualify under the statute it must
be certified as "unfit for human habitation" by an inspector who
has examined the building. . Once such a determination of unfit-
ness has been made, the duty of the lessee to pay rent is suspended
and the lessor is given six months to correct the violations. The
rent due during this period is placed in an escrow account. If, at
any time within the six-month period the dwelling is found to
18SCAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1941-42 (West 1954); MONT. REv. CODES ANN.
§ 42-201 to -202 (1947) ; N.D. CENT CODE §§ 47-16-12 to -13 (1960) ; OKLA.
STATE. tit. 41, §§ 31-32 (1971); S.D. CODE §§ 38.0409-.0410 (1939).
186CAT Civ. CODE §§ 1941-42 (West 1954); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 42-202 (1947).187e.g., Staples v. Baty, 206 Okla. 288, 242 P.2d 705 (1952).188MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. IIl §§ 127F, 127H (1971); ch. 239, §8A
(Supp. 1972); MICH. ComP. LAWS §§ 125.530, 125.534, 125.536 (Supp.
1971); N.Y. MULT. DWELL LAW § 302-A, REAL. PROP. ACTIONS § 755
(McKinney Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1970).
'
89See Note, Rent Withholding in Pennsylvania, 30 U. PIT. L. REv. 148
(1968).
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be habitable, the rent in escrow is paid to the lessor; if, after six
months, the dwelling is not found to be habitable, the rent in es-
crow is returned to the lessee, except for funds used in making
the dwelling habitable and for payment of utility services. The
weakness of this procedure is that although the funds in escrow
can be used by the lessor to make the needed repairs, they seldom
are. 190 This points up a fundamental problem in this area that has
yet to be solved-it may be economically unfeasible for lessors
to place a badly dilapidated building in habitable condition. For
example, in New York City in 1969, lessors left 30,000 buildings
abandoned and without services, generally for economic reasons.191
One alternative, the one being turned to more and more today, it
seems, is federal assistance:
Consideration of the problem of housing the poor must begin
with acknowledgment that it is not profitable to provide de-
cent housing at rents poor people can afford:
There is no way for private owners to make a profit by
housing the poor in decent standard housing except
through some form of aid or by demanding excessive
payments from the poor. This fact must be faced.
Substantial subsidies are essential and the federal government
is the only likely source for such funding.192
A third approach has been to enact statutes which authorize the
institution of receiverships for the management and repair of of-
fending buildings. 193 Where there has been a long history of con-
tinuing violations of building codes on the property, it becomes
apparent that the owner cannot or will not make the necessary
repairs; therefore, the appointment of a receiver is one way to
break the inertia of the situation. Statutes of this type have been
upheld in Illinois' 94 and New York.1 95
1901d. at 150-52.
191N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1970, at 42, col. 4; see Comment Landlord and
Tenant Law-Warranty of Habitability Implied by Lmv in Leases of Urban
Dwellings, 24 VAND. L. REv. 425 (1971).
192Roisman, The Right to Public Housing, 39 Gno. WASH. L. REv. at
692 (1971) (footnotes omitted).193CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-347(b) (1969); ILL. REV. SAT. ch. 24,
§ 11-31-2 (Supp. 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:48-2.12h (1967); N.Y.
MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
194Community Renewal Foundation v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 44 Ill.2d
284, 255 N.E.2d 908 (1970).
29Sin re Department of Buildings (Philo Realty), 14 N.Y.2d 291, 200
N.E.2d 432 (1964).
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A fourth approach has been to expressly provide for an implied
warranty of quality in the lease of real property. Connecticut has
recently adopted a statute 96 which provides that each parol lease
of real property intended for human habitation shall be deemed
to contain a covenant on the part of the lessor that such property
is fit for such habitation. This direct approach is the most recent
one tried and has not been widely adopted at the present time.
Whether such a statute is surrounded by limitations similar to
those surrounding "repair and deduct" statutes or is construed
along different lines remains to be seen.
The State of New York has as wide ranging a set of statutes
dealing with untenantability of leasehold premises as any state
at the present time. In addition to the remedy of rent abatement
given to the lessee which allows rent to be placed in escrow while
designated "rent impairing" conditions continue to exist on the
premises, 197 when one third of the lessees in a building join in a
petition alleging the existence of conditions dangerous to health
or safety, the lessees may request that an administrator be ap-
pointed to collect the rents and make repairs. 198 As was discussed
earlier, 199 the Spiegal Law allows welfare authorities to withhold
an indigent lessee's rent from the lessor when there are conditions
in the building wherein the lessee's apartment is located that are
dangerous to life.or health. Under these circumstances the lessee
is given a statutory defense to an action of eviction brought by
the lessor for nonpayment of rent. Two other types of statutes
should be mentioned because they are commonly found in states
other than New York. The first provides for criminal prosecu-
tion of the owner-lessor of substandard housing. 200 This approach
has been criticized as establishing a system of licensing rather
than constituting an effective deterrent to substandard housing.201
The second approach is unsatisfactory in any area suffering
from a housing shortage because it may result in evicting lessees
19 6CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-24(b) (Supp. 1971).
197See note 59 supra.
198N.Y. REAL. PROP. ACTIONS § 770 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
199See Section III-B-4, note 88 supra; see ILL REv. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-23
(Supp. 1972); MICH. CoMP. LAws § 400.14c (Supp. 1971).
200N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. LAW § 304 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
201Note, Judicial Expansion of Tenants' Private Law. Rights: Implied
Warranties of Habitability and Safety in Residential Urban Leases, 56 COR-
NELL L. REv. 489 (1971). In 1965, the average fine in New York City was
$13.96. N.Y. Times, April 15, 1966, at 36, col. 5.
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who have no other place to go.202 Most people will agree that even
a substandard home is better than no home at all.
3. Effect of Housing Codes
Recently, courts have started to turn to the most prolific
source203 of housing standards in the United States-municipal
housing codes-in an effort to adjust the rights of lessor and
lessee in today's urban setting. For several years it has been
recognized that such codes could be used to imply a warranty
of quality in leases:
These codes are seemingly an appropriate basis for a con-
tinuing implied warranty since they generally require that
essentials such as heating, lighting, ventilation and plumbing
facilities with adequate sewage disposal be installed and prop-
erly maintained. Furthermore, most codes have established
maintenance and cleanliness standards for buildings, including
elimination of vermin, rodents, and other unsanitary con-
ditions.2 04
The judiciary is beginning to pick up this theme. In Lemle v.
Breeden205 the plaintiff-lessee rented a furnished house from the
defendant-lessor for two separate, short periods of time. Soon
after moving in the lessee detected large numbers of rats in the
house and informed the lessor's agent, who exterminated the house
with only partially successful results. Three days after first occu-
pying the house the lessee vacated and demanded a return of his
deposit and rent payments already made, claiming constructive
eviction and breach of an implied warranty of habitability and
fitness for use. The Hawaii Supreme Court upheld a judgment
for the lessee on the latter theory. The court said that the doc-
trine of caveat em ptor has historically been applied to leases be-
cause a lease has always been considered the sale of an estate in
202N.y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
203As of 1968, over 4,900 municipalities had enacted housing codes that set
minimum standards of sanitation and safety which the lessor was obligated
to maintain in leased dwellings. F. Grad. LEGAL REMEDIES FOR HOUSING
CODE VroLATnONs 112 (National Comm'n on Urban Problems Research Rep.
No. 14, 1968).
204Note, Municipal Housing Codes, 69 HARV. L. Rv. at 1116 nn. 12 & 13
(1956).
20551 Haw. 426, 478, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
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land, but that this doctrine has outlived its historical justification.
At a time when a lease embodied all the agreements of the parties,
there was equal knowledge of the land by both lessor and lessee,
and the land itself was the most important element, caveat emptor
may have been justified. But, today, in an urban society where
the main benefit of a lease is the amenities provided by the lessor
and standardized clauses are used, caveat emptor should not be
applicable. The court rejected the application of the constructive
eviction doctrine, saying this was an artificial solution to the prob-
lem. Relying on the reasons why implied warranties of fitness
and merchantability have been applied in the chattel-sales field,
the court stated that a lease is a contractual relationship, and, con-
sequently, a warranty of habitability is a just and necessary im-
plication. The court held that the implied warranty of habitability
had been breached in this case, giving rise to the ordinary contract
remedies of damages, reformation and rescission. Here the lessee
was entitled to rescind the lease and vacate the premises.
The court in Lemle does not explicitly rely on a housing code
in implying a warranty of habitability in the lease in that case, but
a case following soon after and relying heavily on Lemle does
explicitly rely on a housing code. In Lund v. MacArthur2° 6 the
plaintiff-lessor leased an unfinished apartment to the defendant-
lessee for a term of one year. The lessee notified the lessor of
wiring defects, and, soon after, the city building department noti-
fied the lessor that violations of the city electrical code existed on
the premises and ordered the lessor to repair. The lessee vacated
soon thereafter and the lessor brought suit for unpaid rent. The
lessee defended on the basis that the violations of the electrical
code constituted a breach of an implied warranty of habitability,
entitling him to recover the difference between the amount of rent
paid as stipulated in the lease and the fair rental value of the
premises in the "as is" condition. The Hawaii Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the trial court's judgment in the lessor's
favor, holding that under Lemle an implied warranty of habitabil-
ity exists in unfurnished as well as furnished dwellings. The court
instructed the trial court to determine if the violations of the elec-
trical code constituted a breach of the implied warranty of habita-
bility, treating the code as the measure of the warranty.
20651 Haw. 473 462 P.2d 482 (1969).
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In Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,20 7 previously dis-
cussed, 208 a lessor sued his lessee for possession of the premises
for nonpayment of rent. As a defense the lessee offered evidence
of numerous violations of the Housing Regulations of the District
of Columbia. The lower court ruled that evidence inadmissible,
but the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit reversed this decision, saying:
In our judgment, the old no-repair rule cannot coexist with
the obligations imposed by a typical modern housing code,
and must be abandoned in favor of an implied warranty of
habitability. In the District of Columbia, the standards of this
warranty are set out in the Housing Regulations.
We believe . . . that the District's housing code requires
that a warranty of habitability be implied in the leases of all
housing that it covers. 20 9
The court went on to hold that the duties imposed by the Housing
Regulations could not be waived or shifted by agreement of the
parties. This approach protects the lessee much more than do the
"repair and deduct" statutes discussed earlier. 210 In addition to
this protection, the court's holding extends to the lessee all of the
existing remedies for breach of contract. 211 Therefore, the lessee
is not limited to a defensive use of the warranty, but can affirma-
tively use the remedies of specific performance and set-off.
Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown,2 12 also previously discussed, 213
followed Javins in a situation where there were violations of the
New York City Housing Code in existence on the premises when
the lessor leased them to the lessee. When the lessor sued to
evict the lessee for nonpayment of rent, the court sustained the
lessee's defense of breach of an implied warranty of habitability
because: (1) the lessor had made no good faith effort to comply
with the Code; (2) there were substantial violations on the
premises and code enforcement remedies had been pursued and
found to be ineffective; and (3) the lessor continued the violations
207428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).208See Section III-B-4, note 85 supra.
209428 F.2d at 1076-77, 1080.
21OSee note 56, supra, and accompanying text.
21116 ViLL. L. REV. at 393-94 (1970).
21265 Misc.2d 15, 318, N.Y.S.2d 11 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1971).
213See Section 111-B-4, note 87 supra.
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pursuant to a scheme to force this lessee and others to vacate the
premises.
In Kline v. Burns214 the plaintiff-lessee leased premises from
the defendant-lessor under an oral tenancy at will. Later, the
lessee sued to recover all rent paid under the lease on the basis
that the lease was in violation of the city housing code. The lessor
then sued to recover possession and unpaid rent. The city build-
ing inspector conducted an inspection and found code violations,
some of which had existed for a long period of time. The trial
court dismissed the lessee's action for rent already paid and grant-
ed judgment to the lessor for possession and for unpaid rent. In
reversing this judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
pointed out that the conditions under which the common law rule
of caveat emptor was formulated have changed and that such a
rule is no longer just. The court listed these factors for consider-
ation in determining the principles to be applied to modern urban
leases: (1) the legislature, by passing enabling legislation for
municipal housing codes, has recognized that public welfare re-
quires that dwellings be habitable and safe at the outset and
throughout the life of the lease; (2) the lessor has better knowl-
edge of the condition of the premises than the lessee; (3) it is
more appropriate for the lessor, who retains ownership of the
premises together with all improvements, to bear the cost of repairs
necessary to make the premises habitable and safe, and (4) in
today's housing market the lessor is in a better bargaining position
than the lessee. These considerations led the court to conclude
that there should be implied in a lease, written or oral, for a
specific time or at will, a warranty of habitability that the premises
are habitable and fit for living at the inception of the lease and
throughout its life. Under this view the lessee has the basic con-
tractual remedies of damages, reformation or rescission. In the
present case the lessee's damages were the difference between the
agreed rent and the fair rental value of the premises in their con-
dition while occupied by the lessee.
VI. UNCONSCIONABLE CLAUSES
One contractual principle that has been molded into many forms
214276 A.2d 248 (N.H. 1971).
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and applied to real property leases is that of unconscionability. As
with the illegality principle, although used in the past in the lease-
hold area, the doctrine of unconscionability has recently taken on
new shapes to deal with present leasehold problems.
A. Contract Principles
The common law adopted a laissez faire attitude in the law of
contracts that expressed itself in two generally accepted theo-
ries:215 (1) freedom of contract, and (2) stability of contract.
Under the concept of freedom of contract, the parties to a private
agreement are allowed to reach any terms they so desire so long
as the terms do not violate some legislative policy or other public
policy. The parties are given the freedom to negotiate the best
terms possible for each, based on their relative positions, even
though these positions may not be perfectly equal. Under the con-
cept of stability of contract, the law has been loath to step into a
contract and alter its terms on the basis that the terms are "un-
conscionable," i.e., harsh, oppressive or unfair to one party. The
reason for this reluctance is that to do so would be to make a new
contract for the parties, creating uncertainty in the law of con-
tracts since the parties to a contract could never be sure that terms
negotiated into a contract would be left intact and not altered.
Both of these theories are justified to some degree on the fact
that parties to a private agreement can and do negotiate over the
terms of the agreement. If the ability to negotiate is absent, for
one reason or another, then there is no true "freedom" to contract
in the particular situation and the "stability" becomes a straight
jacket used to enclose one party to the agreement.216 This type
of "agreement" is known as a standard form contract or contract
of adhesion which gives rise to the problem of unconscionability.
"Unconscionability" is not a label or a specific defense, but a
generic term covering a wide variety of situations. It has been
used most often in equity to prevent the specific performance of a
contract so harsh and oppressive as to be associated with fraud,
mistake, incapacity or inadequacy of consideration. 217 Originally,
unconscionability was not available as a defense at law,218 but it
has gradually become recognized as a defense where there is gross
21520 ARK. L. Rzv. 165 (1966); Note, Unconscionable Contracts: The
Uniform Commercial Code, 45 IOWA L. REv. 843 (1960).
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inequality of bargaining positions between the parties.219 More
often, however, law courts have reached the result that an uncon-
scionable contract clause will not be enforceable by use of technical
bases such as construing a contract strictly against the maker, lack
of mutuality and limitation on disclaimer of warranties,220
In contrast to the often indirect approach taken by the common
law in dealing with unconscionable clauses in contracts, the Uni-
form Commercial Code takes a very direct approach to the problem
in sales contracts:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time
it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or
it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the un-
conscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.221
The term "unconscionability" is not defined in the Code, but it
has been argued to be equivalent to "grossly unfair." 222 However,
the comments following the section quoted above do shed light on
the intention of the draftsmen of the Code to give courts the au-
thority to deal directly with the problem of unconscionable con-
tract clauses:
1. This section is intended to make it possible for the courts
to police explicitly against the contracts or clauses which they
find to be unconscionable. In the past such policing has been
accomplished by adverse construction of language, by manipu-
lation of the rules of offer and acceptance or by determinations
that the clause is contrary to public policy or to the dominant
purpose of the contract. This section is intended to allow
the court to pass directly on the unconscionability of the con-
that or particular clause therein and to make a conclusion of
law as to its unconscionability.
2. Under this section the court, in its discretion, may refuse
216See Llewellyn, Whate Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40
YALE L.J. 704 (1931).217e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948); see I
CORBIN § 128.
2181 CoRBN § 128.
219Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Co., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
22020 ARK. L. REV., supra note 215, at 166.
221§ 2-302.
22245 IowA L. REv., supra note 215, at 849.
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to enforce the contract as a whole if it is permeated by the
unconscionability, or it may strike out any single clause or
group of clauses which are so tainted or which are contrary
to the essential purpose of the agreement, or it may simply
limit unconscionable clauses so as to avoid unconscionable
results. 223
B. Real Property Leases
1. Clauses Favoring the Lessor
There are types of clauses favorable to the lessor in real prop-
erty leases, especially those entered into by the indigent lessee of
urban residential premises, that give rise to the problem of uncon-
scionability. 224 Six types are found most commonly: (1) clauses
whereby the lessee waives notice to quit and which state that non-
payment of rent operates as notice to quit; (2) clauses whereby
the lessee is prohibited from using premises for disorderly or un-
lawful purposes, is prohibited from creating noise or annoyance
detrimental to premises or other inhabitants, and is prohibited
from engaging in any acts which constitute annoyance, damage or
disturbance to the lessor, of which the lessor shall be the sole
judge; (3) clauses in term leases providing for acceleration of
rent for the entire term upon the lessee's failure to pay any
periodic installment and providing for termination of the lease at
the lessor's option in event of default; (4) clauses whereby the
lessee undertakes to pay attorney's fees and other costs and ex-
penses of the lessor by reason of the lessee's default; (5) clauses
imposing a duty of repair on the lessee; and (6) clauses exculpat-
ing the lessor from liability for damages to the lessee for failure
to repair or other act of nonfeasance. This last type of clause is
the one found perhaps most often in leases and the one which
has generated the most litigation; consequently, it will be used to
demonstrate how the law deals with a lease clause deemed to be
unconscionable. This type of clause can either be an exculpatory
clause or an indemnity clause. An exculpatory clause is one which
acts to release the exculpatee from liability from any future acts
223§2-302, Comments 1 and 2; see Comment, Bargaining Power and Un-
conscionability: A Suggested Approach to U.C.C. Section 2-302, 114 U. PA.
L. REv. 998 (1966); Comment, The Uniform Commercial Code's Solutionfor Unconscionable Contracts, 48 ORE. L. REv. 209 (1969).
B. Real Property Leases2 24Schoshinski, Remedies for the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change,
54 GEo. L.J. 519, 552-53 (1966).
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of negligence by the exculpatee which might result in harm to the
exculpator; an indemnity clause is one which covers the risk of
harm sustained by third persons that might be caused by either
the indemnitor or the indemnitee and acts to effect a shift of the
financial burden for the ultimate payment of damages from the
indemnitee to the indemnitor. 225
The general common law rule is that exculpatory clauses releas-
ing a lessor from liability in tort for injuries traceable to the
condition of the leased premises are upheld as within the proper
scope of the freedom to contract, or as a reasonable substitute for
the lessor's carrying of insurance, or for some other reason.
226
This rule has been applied to absolve a lessor from liability for
personal injuries sustained by a residential lessee caused by the
lessor's negligence, 227 to absolve a lessor from liability for property
damage sustained by a residential lessee caused by the lessor's
negligence, 228 and to absolve a lessor from liability for property
damage sustained by a commercial lessee caused by the lessor's
negligence. 229
However, from this rule there have been traditional and more
recent departures that demonstrate the fact that the unconscion-
ability doctrine has played a role and will continue to play an ex-
panding role in the construction and determination of validity of
lease clauses. The traditional departure from the common law
rule has been based on a strict interpretation of the exculpatory
clause against the draftsman, who is ordinarily the lessor. Certain
standards have been devised to circumscribe the use of exculpatory
clauses. 230 These standards are: (1) an exculpatory clause must
be construed strictly because they are not favored; (2) an excul-
patory clause must set forth the intention of the parties with the
greatest pariculariy; (3) an exculpatory clause must be construed
against the party seeking exculpation; and (4) the burden of
establishing immunity from liability is on the party seeking im-
munity.
22sWeaver v. American Oil Co., 261 N.E.2d 99 (Ind. App. Ct. 1970),
inodified, 262 N.E.2d 663 (Ind. App. Ct. 1970).
2262 POWELL § 234[4]; 6 WILLISTON § 1751C, at 4969-70.227Mackenzie v. Ryan, 230 Minn. 378, 41 N.W.2d 878 (1950).228King v. Smith, 47 Ga. App. 360, 170 S.E. 546 (1933).
22 9 Plaza Hotel Co. v. Fine Products Corp., 87 Ga. App. 460, 74 S.E.2d
372 (1953); Manaster v. Gopin, 330 Mass. 569, 116 N.E.2d 134 (1953).23oSee Employers Liability Assurance Corp. v. Greenville Business Men's
Ass'n, 423 Pa. 288, 224 A.2d 620 (1966).
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An illustration of the general application of these standards is
found in Galligan v. Arovitch,231 where the plaintiff-lessee entered
into a lease with the defendant-lessor whereby the lessee agreed to
relieve the lessor of all liability by reason of any injury to the
lessee arising from the lessee's use of elevators, hatches, openings,
stairways, fire escapes, hallways, and sidewalks. The lessee was
injured when she tripped on the lawn area in front of the lessor's
apartment building . When the lessee sued the lessor in a tort
action based on negligence, the lessor relied on the exculpatory
clause. The trial court upheld this defense, but the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reversed, stating that an exculpatory clause should
be strictly construed against the maker (lessor), and, applying
that rule of construction to the case, the exculpatory clause would
not be a valid defense because the injury did not occur in any one
of the seven places listed in the clause. The same approach has
been taken in cases involving property damage sustained by a
lessee due to the lessor's negligence. 232
The standards of strict construction discussed above cause ex-
culpatory clauses to be inapplicable in certain types of situations.
An exculpatory clause may not be applicable where the tort is
committed by a lessor in some capacity other than that of lessor.
In W. F. Zimmerman, Inc. v. Daggett N Ramsdell, Inc.2 33 the
plaintiff-lessee subleased commercial premises from the defendant-
lessor by a lease which incorporated into the sublease all terms of
the lessor's main lease with his lessor. The main lease contained
a clause stating that the lessor would not be liable for any damage
to property on the premises because of any defect and the lessor
would not be liable for loss of property due to explosion. The
defendant operated a tank of volatile fluid in conjunction with its
business which exploded, causing injury to the plaintiff's premises.
When the plaintiff sued for the damage caused by the defendant's
negligence, the defendant relied on the exculpatory clause incor-
porated into the sublease. The court, relying on the strict con-
struction doctrine, held the clause inapplicable, saying: "The boun-
231421 Pa. 301, 219 A.2d 463 (1966).232Butt v. Bertola, 110 Cal. App.2d 128, 242 P.2d 32 (1952) ; Sun Copper
& Wire Co. v. White Lamp, Inc., 12 N.J. Super. 87, 79 A.2d 93 (1951);
Sacher v. Murray Lenox Land Co., 171 N.Y.S. 216 (Sup. Ct. App. Term
1917).
23334 N.J. Super. 81, 111 A.2d 448 (1955); accord, Smith v. Faxon, 156
Mass. 589, 31 N.E. 687 (1892).
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daries of the field of exempted liability are staked out by the
legal relationship which the parties mutually assumed, namely,
that of landlord and tenant." 234 Here the damage was caused by
the defendant's negligence in pursuit of its independent business
venture which was unconnected with its function as a lessor.
An exculpatory clause will not serve as a defense to a tort oc-
curring before entry into the lease. In Employers' Liability As-
surance Corp. v. Greenville235 the plaintiff's insured was in pos-
session of premises without benefit of the lease in question at a
time when the defendant-lessor's negligence caused an automatic
sprinkler system to activate, causing flooding and damage to the
insured's property. The parties later executed a lease containing
a clause exculpating the lessor from liability for any damage occur-
ring to the lessee's property. The plaintiff-subrogee of the
lessee's rights brought an action against the lessor for its negli-
gence and the lessor relied on the exculpatory clause. Applying
the strict construction doctrine, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that the clause did not grant immunity for negligence occur-
ring prior to entry into the lease because, first, the lease did not
specifically grant immunity for acts of negligence occurring prior
to the lease, and, second, the parties contemplated future conduct
only, and, consequently, the clause was intended to operate pros-
pectively, not retrospectively.
Freddi-Gail, Inc. v. Royal Holding Corp.236 deals with the prob-
lem of misfeasance, i.e., affirmative negligence, as opposed to non-
feasance. The lessee leased premises from the lessor by a lease
containing a clause relieving the lessor of liability for any damage
due to water leakage. The lessee sued the lessor for property
damage claimed to have been caused by water leakage due to
faulty repairs made by the lessor. The lessor's defense based on
the exculpatory clause was not upheld, the court adopting the rule
that an exculpatory clause exempting a lessor from liability for
damage by water, without clearly referring to the matter of negli-
gence on the lessor's part, does not absolve him from his own
23434 N.J. Super. at 84, 111 A.2d at 450.
235423 Pa. 288, 224 A.2d 620 (1966) ; accord, Kotwasinski v. Rasner, 436
Pa. 32, 258 A.2d 865 (1969).
23634 N.J. Super. 142, 111 A.2d 636 (App. Div. 1955) ; accord, Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Poling, 248 Iowa 582, N.W.2d 462 (1957); Carbone v. Cort-
landt Realty Corp., 58 N.J. 366, 277 A.2d 542 (1971); Anno., 175 A.L.R,
8,89 (1948).
[Vol. XXIV
REAL PROPERTY LEASES
affirmative negligence. The court adopted this rule pursuant to
a strict construction given to the clause in controversy.
The strict construction doctrine has frequently been applied in
cases where the tort involved is committed by the lessor on prem-
ises remaining under his control. In Daltex, Inc. v. Western Oil
& Fuel Co.237 the lessee leased commercial premises from the
lessor by a lease which included an exculpatory clause. The
lessee's property was damaged by a fire started due to the lessor's
negligence in allowing a furnace under the lessor's control and
located on premises occupied by the lessor to overheat and set fire
to combustible materials nearby. The Minnesota Supreme Court
rejected the lessor's defense based on the exculpatory clause, hold-
ing that, under the strict construction doctrine utilized because
the lease was drawn by the lessor, the clause would not be con-
strued to relieve the lessor of liability for damage caused by its
negligence committed upon its own premises.
Finally, the doctrine of strict construction has been utilized to
limit the effectiveness of an exculpatory clause where the tort
involved is committed off the leased premises. In Wilmington
Housing Authority v. Williamson238 the parents of the plaintiffs,
minor children, leased residential premises from the lessor by a
lease containing a clause releasing the lessor from liability for any
injury to the lessee or members of his household resulting from
any cause whatsoever. The plaintiffs were injured off the apart-
ment premises when they played on a path leading from the
grounds to a steep and rough descent to railroad tracks adjacent
to the premises. The plaintiffs sued the lessor, claiming it was
negligent in allowing the path to remain unfenced when it knew
of the existence of the path. The Delaware Supreme Court re-
fused to uphold the lessor's defense based on the exculpatory
clause, stating that, under the doctrine of strict construction, the
effect of the clause "must be confined to the physical premises
actually leased to the adult plaintiff."
A second departure from the common law rule recognizing ex-
culpatory clauses stems from the view that such clauses violate
public policy. The freedom of contract and stability of contract
237275 Minn. 509, 148 N.W.2d 377 (1967); accord, Batwin v. Rathkopf,
128 Misc. 15, 217 N.Y.S. 192 (Sup. Ct., App. Term 1926); LeVette v.
Hardman's Estate, 77 Wash. 320, 137 P. 454 (1914).
238228 A.2d 782 (Del. 1967) ; accord, Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App.2d
1013, 50 Cal. Rep. 806 (1967).
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theories are partially based on the assumption that parties have a
right to make any type of agreement concerning their private af-
fairs.2 39 But once the agreement breaks over into some area of
public concern, expressed in some public policy, then limitations
on the agreement come into play. Papakalos v. Shaka240 deals
with this point in a situation where the lessee orally leased resi-
dential premises from the lessor by an agreement whereby one
rental would be charged if the lessor repaired the premises, but
a lesser rental would be charged if the lessor did not repair the
premises. The lessee was injured on a common stairway and sued
the lessor, claiming the injury was caused by the lessor's negligent
failure to maintain the stairway. The lessor argued that the agree-
ment providing for a different rental based on the presence or ab-
sence of repairs was tantamount to an exculpatory clause. The
New Hampshire Supreme Court doubted that such construction
could be given to the agreement and held: "But however this [the
construction of the agreement] may be, the whole answer to this
contention of the defendant is to be found in our rule that one may
not by contract relieve himself from the consequences of the future
nonperformance of his common-law duty to exercise ordinary
care."24 1 In a later New Hampshire case the court relied on
Papakalos in making this statement: "Defendant's counsel con-
cede that in this jurisdiction the ordinary contract exempting a
person from liability for the consequences of his negligence is held
to be void as against public policy." 242
This same view of an exculpatory clause has been adopted re-
cently in the District of Columbia. In Tenants' Council of Tiber
Island-Carrollsburg Square v. DeFranceauX243 the plaintiff-lessees
leased apartments from the lessor in a complex that included a
swimming pool operated by the lessor and financed through rents
paid by all lessees. The form supplied by the lessor used for
applying for membership rights to use the pool contained a clause
relieving the lessor of all liability for any injuries sustained by
239See Employers Liability Assurance Corp. v. Greenville Business Men's
Ass'n, 423 Pa. 288, 224 A.2d 620 (1966).
24091 N.H. 265, 18 A.2d 377 (1941).
24 11d. 18 A.2d 379 (1941).24 2 Nashua Gummed & Coated Paper Co. v. Noyes Buick Co., 41 A.2d 920,
922 (1945); accord, Shaer Shoe Corp. v. Granite State Alarm, Inc., 110
N.H. 132, 262 A2d 285 (1970).
243305 F. Supp. 560 (D.D.C. 1969).
[Vol. XXlV
REAL PROPERTY LEASES
the lessees. The lessees objected to this clause, and, when the
lessor refused to admit them to pool-club membership without
signing the liability-waiver application card, they brought this
action seeking to restrain the lessor from requiring them to agree
to the clause to obtain use of the pool. The court granted judg-
ment for the lessees, stating that "[t]he challenged clause is invalid
as against public policy," both under the common law and the
District of Columbia Building Code.
The public policy basis for refusing to recognize exculpatory
clauses is discussed in McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp.2 4 4 In
this case the lessee entered into a residential lease which contained
a clause relieving the lessor of all liability for injury to the lessee
on the premises. The lessee was injured when she fell down un-
lighted stairs and sued the lessor for the damage caused by its
alleged negligent failure to keep the common area in a safe condi-
tion. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the lower court
judgments upholding the validity of the exculpatory clause, stating
that the clause did not relate to the "personal and private affairs
of two parties on an equal footing," because residential leasing
has grown to such high proportions (citing statistics) that there
is a public interest involved today that prevents the recognition
of exculpatory clauses. In the court's language: "Under these
circumstances [referring to cited statistics] it cannot be said that
such exculpatory clauses are 'purely a private affair' or that they
are 'not a matter of public interest.' ",245
McCutcheon raises a consideration that serves as a third point
of departure from the common law rule-the relative equality or
inequality of the bargaining positions of the parties to a lease. Do
the parties occupy positions that allow each to bargain over the
terms of the agreement, or, are their positions so unequal that one
dictates the terms which the weaker party must simply adhere to
if he wishes to enter into the agreement? This latter situation is
one that has arisen in a number of areas, notably the insurance
industry, and has given birth to the standardized contract or con-
tract of adhesion. 246 The problems surrounding this type of agree-
24479 Wash.2d 443, 486 P.2d 1093 (1971).
2 45d. 486 P.2d at 1097.2 4 6See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom
of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943). The term "contract of adhe-
sion" was first applied to insurance contracts; see Patterson, The Delivery
of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARv. L. Rav. 198, 222 (1919).
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ment are present in the leasehold field. Two approaches have been
taken to the real property lease that is determined to be a contract
of adhesion because of inequality of bargaining power between the
lessor and lessee. The first approach is to make use of evidenciary
presumptions concerning knowledge of the exculpatory clause in
determining whether the clause is valid. The approach is suited
to commercial leases more than residential leases because the de-
gree of inequality of bargaining power is usually not as critical
as is knowledge of the lease terms and their importance. This
first approach is illustrated in Weaver v. American Oil Co.,2 47
where the lessee entered into a commercial lease with the lessor
which included an exculpatory and indemnity clause relieving the
lessor of liability for acts of negligence toward the lessee. When
the lessee was injured by the lessor's negligence, the lessor
brought suit for declaratory judgment, relying on the exculpatory
and indemnity clause. The court held that the clause was not void
as contrary to public policy, but was void under "freedom of con-
tract principles. The court stated:
[because of] the unusual and considerable burden imposed
by the exculpatory clause ... it is not enforceable unless it
appears that the party who assumes the burden under the
clause was aware of its existence and understood its far-
reaching implications. Where there is approximate equality
of bargaining positions, it is rebuttably presumed that the
assuming party had such knowledge and understanding. How-
ever, where there is a patent disparity of bargaining posi-
tions, it is rebuttably presumed that there was not the requi-
site notice or understanding. In the case at bar there existed
between the parties a patent disparity of bargaining positions
and because there is nothing to indicate that [defendant] was
aware of the clause or its implications the presumption that
there was no notice or understanding remains unrebutted and
the exculpatory clause is not enforceable. 248
The second approach, referred to in dicta in Kay v. Cain,249
involves the outright holding of the exculpatory clause void due
to an inequality of bargaining power between the parties. This
approach is more suited to residential leases because the question
247261 N.E.2d 99 (Ind. App. Ct. 1970), modified, 262 N.E.2d 663 (Ind.
App. Ct. 1970).
241d. at 104.
249154 F.2d 305 D.C. Cir, 1946).
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is not as much the knowledge of such clauses as the ability to
negotiate concerning them,250 In Kay the lessee leased residential
premises from the lessor by a lease that contained an exculpatory
lease. The lessee fell and injured himself in an unlighted hallway
and sued the lessor for negligence in maintaining this common
area. The court refused to sustain the lessor's defense based on
the exculpatory clause on the basis that, under the principle of
ejusdem generis, the clause did not refer to negligence in failing
to light a common area. 251 The court went on to say that it was
doubtful whether a clause which did purport to exempt a lessor
from liability for negligence would be valid in light of the acute
housing shortage in and near the District of Columbia which gave
the lessor so great a bargaining advantage that the clause should
be held violative of public policy.
This position was taken in Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, Inc.,252 a
case where the lease contained an exculpatory clause which was
relied on by the lessor when it was sued by the lessee for negli-
gently failing to maintain a common stairway. The court reversed
a summary judgment for the lessor on the following grounds:
Another basis for declaring invalid a bargain, otherwise
valid, which exempts one from future liability, is where a re-
lationship exists in which the parties have not equal bargain-
ing power, and one of them must accept what is offered or be
deprived of the advantages of the relation.
We also take judicial note that under present housing con-
ditions the bargaining positions of landlord and tenant in an
apartment building are decidedly unequal.
Under present conditions, the comparative bargaining posi-
tions of landlords and tenants in housing accommodations
within many areas of the state are so unequal that tenants
are in no position to bargain; and an exculpatory clause
which purports to immunize the landlord from all liability
would be contrary to public policy. 25 3
Although New Jersey continues to take this position relative to
2SOSee Section V-C-2, note 246 supra.25lSee note 231 supra and accompanying text.
25233 N.J. Super. 575, Ill A.2d 425 (App. Div. 1955).
2531d. at 430, 431, 432.
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residential leases, it has refused to apply it to commercial leases.2 54
There is one type of lessor whose nature prevents it from uti-
lizing exculpatory clauses-the public housing authority. In Hous-
ing Authority of Birmingham v. Morris255 the lessee leased resi-
dential premises from the lessor, a public body created by statute
to erect, operate and maintain public housing, by a lease relieving
the lessor of liability for damage to the person or property of the
lessee from any cause whatsoever. The lessee was injured because
of a malfunction of the water system and hot water heater caused
by the lessor's negligence. The Alabama Supreme Court, in up-
holding a judgment in favor of the lessee in a suit brought against
the lessor, stated that an agreement exempting persons from lia-
bility for their negligence induces a lack of due care on their part;
therefore, "... . public policy forbids that [public service corpora-
tions] contract for immunity for their negligence or the negligence
of their servants or agents committed in the prosecution of their
major business." 256
A different reason for reaching the same result was utilized
recently by the Washington Supreme Court in Thomas v. Housing
Authority of the City of Bremerton.257 In this case, on facts sim-
ilar to those found in Morris, the court held the exculpatory
clause contained in the lease to be void as violative of public policy
for the following reason:
Public housing such as that provided by the defendant is
only available to "persons of low income," in other words,
those who the legislature has determined are unable to obtain
safe and sanitary housing elsewhere. The situation presents
a classic example of unequal bargaining power .... We think
that the instant matter, in which the [parents of the injured
plaintiff] had to sign the defendant's standard lease form in
order to acquire housing in West Park, is an example of an
obvious disadvantage in bargaining power which would have
the effect, if the exculpatory provision were upheld, of put-
ting the tenants at the mercy of the defendant housing au-
thoritys' negligence. This would be contrary to the public
policy inherent in the basic legislation and authorization rela-
tive to low rent public housing.258
254Midiand Carpet Corp. v. Franklin Associated Properties, 90 N.J. Super.
42, 216 A.2d 231 (N.J. App. Div. 1966).
255244 Ala. 557, 14 So.2d 527 (1943).
2561d. at 531.
25771 Wash.2d 69, 426 P.2d 836 (1967).
2581d. at 842.
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There are two types of legislation which are playing expanded
roles in the area under discussion-municipal codes and state
statutes. Such municipal codes as housing and fire codes are
widely adopted across the United States25 9 and can often be uti-
lized in determining the effectiveness of exculpatory lease clauses.
In Gilpin v. Abraham260 the lessee sued his lessor for injuries
sustained in a fall resulting from the collapse of a platform caused
by the lessor's negligence. The lessor relied on a clause in the
lease relieving him of liability for injury to the lessee or his guests
caused by the lessor's negligence. The court rendered judgment
in favor of the lessee, holding that the clause was void under the
Philadelphia Housing Code because the Code's purpose is to pro-
tect the public health, safety and welfare and the lessee is entitled
to this protection unaffected by any private agreement.
A fire code was relied on in Hanna v. Lederman.261 In this
case a fire sprinkler system on the leased premises activated and
operated for a substantial period of time, causing damage to the
lessee's property. The sprinkler system did not have an alarm
device which would operate when the sprinkler activated, as was
required by the Los Angeles Municipal Code. The lease con-
tained a clause relieving the lessor of liability for damages to
personal property on the premises. The court held that the ex-
culpatory clause could not be a defense to a cause of action based
on a violation of the Code.
Courts in several jurisdictions have reached the conclusion that
state statutes affect the validity of exculpatory clauses. In Boyd
v. Smith262 the lessee leased residential premises from the lessor
by a lease containing a clause relieving the lessor of liability for
injury to the lessee due to the lessor's negligence. A state statute
required an apartment building such as the one the lessee lived in
to have a fire escape; however, this building did not have one and
the lessee was injured in trying to escape from a fire by jumping
from the third floor of the building. The lessee sued the lessor,
who relied on the exculpatory clause. The court upheld the lower
court's judgment in the lessee's favor, stating that since the law
in.question was a police power measure intended to protect human
259See Section V-D-3, note 203 supra.
260218 F. Supp. 414 (E.D. Pa. 1963), appeal dismissed, 328 F.2d 884 (3d
Cir. 1964).
261223 Cal. App.2d 786, 36 Cal. Rep. 150 (1963).
262372 Pa. 306, 94 A.2d 44 (1953).
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life, public policy would not allow a person to waive the protection
afforded by the statute; therefore, the clause was void.
In American States Ins. Co. v. Hannan Construction Co. 263 the
plaintiff-insurance company, subrogated to the rights of the lessee,
sued the lessor for negligence in causing a fire that damaged the
lessee's property. The commercial lease involved contained a
clause relieving the lessor of liability for damage to any goods
maintained on the premises or any damage to property whatso-
ever. The court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, holding that
the clause could not exculpate the lessor from liability because
to do so would thwart the public purposes of an Ohio statute
designed to make buildings "free from danger or hazard to life,
safety, health or welfare of persons occupying or frequenting it
or of the public," and of the related Ohio Building Code.
A Michigan housing law, placing a duty on the lessor to keep
the premises clean, was relied on by the court in Feldman v. Stein
Building & Lumber Co.2 64 when a lessor raised an exculpatory
clause as a defense to a cause of action brought by the lessee who
was injured when he fell in a parking lot adjacent to the apart-
ment because of an accumulation of ice and snow on the lot. The
court construed the statute to require a lessor to remove ice and
snow from the premises and concluded that the exculpatory clause,
being violative of the statute, was against public policy and void.
Three states have dealt directly with the problem of exculpatory
clauses in real property leases.2 65 The New York statute, the first
to be enacted, is illustrative of the others. It provides:
Every covenant, agreement or understanding in or in con-
nection with or collateral to any lease of real property exempt-
ing the lessor from liability for damages for injuries to person
or property caused by or resulting from the negligence of the
lessor, his agents, servants or employees, in the operation or
maintenance of the demised premises shall be deemed to be
void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable.
This statute has been upheld as constitutional against the attack
that it violates the due process clauses and the equal protection
263283 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
2646 Mich. App. 180, 148 N.W.2d 544 (1967).265MD ANN. CODE art. 53, § 40 (1968); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186,
§ 15 (1958) ; N.Y. RA.L PRop. LAW § 234.
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clauses of the United States and New York Constitutions.2 66 A
fourth state, Illinois, enacted similar legislation,2 67 but it was held
unconstitutional as making a discriminatory classification without
reasonable basis by exempting municipal corporations, govern-
mental units, and corporations regulated by a state or federal com-
mission or agency, from its operation.2 68 The Illinois legislature
subsequently enacted a statute voiding exculpatory clauses that is
identical to the New York statute quoted above.2 69
2. Clauses Favoring the Lessee
There is one type of clause favorable to the lessee that has gen-
erated some controversy over whether it is unconscionable or not.
This clause, generally found in commercial leases, states: (1) that
the lessee agrees to make all necessary repairs to the leased prem-
ises excepting damage or destruction by fire or other casualty, in
which case the lessor agrees to insure and restore the premises;
or (2) if found in the surrender covenant, that the lessee will
surrender the premises in as good condition as when received,
"loss by fire and ordinary wear and decay excepted." 270 The ques-
tion is whether or not such a clause exempts the lessee from lia-
bility for loss due to fire or other casualty caused by his negligence.
Cerney-Pickas & Co. v. C. R. Jahn Co. 271 reached the conclu-
sion that such a clause has the effect of exempting the lessee from
liability for loss due to fire or other casualty caused by his negli-
gence. The lessee leased commercial premises from the lessor by
a lease stating, first, that the lessee would keep the premises in
good repair and return them in good condition (loss by fire ex-
cepted), and, second, that the lessor would pay for fire insurance.
When the premises were damaged by fire caused by the lessee's
266Billie Knitwear v. New York Life Ins. Co., 174 Misc. 978, 22 N.Y.S.2d
324 (Sup. Ct. J940), aff'd, 262 App. Div. 714, 27 N.Y.S.2d 328, 329 (1941),
affd, 288 N.Y. 682, 43 N.E.2d 80 (1942).267ILi. Ray. STAT. ch. 80, § 15a (1966).
268Sweney Gasoline & Oil Co. v. Toledo, P. & W. R.R., 42 Ill.2d 265,
247 N.E.2d 603 (1969).26 91LL REv. STAT. ch. 80, § 91 (Supp. 1972).27OSee 7 DuKE L.J. 59 (1957).
2717 Il1.2d 393, 131 N.E.2d 100 (1955) ; accord, General Accidental, Fire
& Life Assur. Corp. v. Traders Furniture Co., 401 P.2d 157 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1965); Stein v. Yarnell-Todd Chevrolet, Inc., 41 Ill.2d 32, 241 N.E.2d 439
(1968); Fry v. Jordan Auto Co., 224 Miss. 445, 80 So.2d 53 (1955) ; Rock
Springs Realty, Inc. v. Waid, 392 S.W.2d 270 (Mo. 1965); United States
Fire Ins. Co. v. Phil-Mar Corp., 166 Ohio St. 85, 139 N.E.2d 330 (1950).
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negligence and the lessor sued to recover damages, the lessee
claimed that the lease exonerated it from liability for loss due to
fire, whether or not the fire was caused by the lessee's negligence.
The court agreed with the lessee for two reasons: (1) unless the
clause included negligently-caused fire, it would not change the
common law rule and would be useless since, at common law, the
lessee would not be liable for any loss unless caused by its negli-
gence; and (2) under the lessor's construction of the lease (lessee
liable for negligently caused fire, but not liable for nonnegligently
caused fire), both the lessor and lessee would necessarily have to
carry fire insurance to be protected, which is repugnant to the
intent of the clause.
A different position is taken by Winkler v. Appalachian Amuse-
ment Co.,272 where the lessee entered into a commercial lease with
the lessor containing the following clauses: (1) lessee would make
all repairs necessary inside the demised building, except in case
of destruction or damage by fire or other casualty; (2) lessor
agreed to keep the premises insured; and (3) lessee would at the
expiration of the lease return possession of the premises in as good
repair as at the time of leasing, ordinary wear and tear excepted
and damage by fire excepted. When the premises were destroyed
by fire due to the lessee's negligence, the lessee defended against a
suit brought by the lessor on the basis that the three clauses excul-
pated him from liability for damage due to his negligence. The
court, in reversing a lower court judgment in favor of the lessee,
held that a contract for exemption from liability for negligence is
not favored and should be strictly construed against the party
asserting it. In the present lease there were no explicit words
exempting the lessee from liability for his own negligence; there-
for, the three clauses in the lease would not be construed to have
that effect.
VII. MITIGATION OF DAMAGES AND ANTICIPATORY
BREACH DOCTRINES
Two related principles of contract law about which there has
272238 N.C. 589, 79 S.E.2d 185 (1953); accord, Stone Mountain Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Bennett, 112 Ga. App. 466, 145 S.E.2d 591 (1965) ; Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Poling, 248 Iowa 582, 81 N.W.2d 462 (1957); Dixie Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 265 N.C. 121, 143 S.E.2d 279 (1965);
Dilks v. Flohr Chevrolet, Inc., 411 Pa. 425, 192 A.2d 682 (1963).
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been some dispute concerning their applicability to real property
leases are those of "mitigation of damages" and "anticipatory
breach." These two doctrines are well entrenched in the law of
contracts, but the dual nature of a lease, with the property aspect
historically having been given preference, has created confusion
and a divergence of opinion in this corner of the leasehold field.
A. Breach of Contract Principles
1. Rule of Avoidable Damages (Mitigation of Damages)
In the contracts field, since the purpose of the rule concerning
damages is to put the injured party in as good a position as he
would have been put by full performance of the contract at the
least necessary cost to the defendant, the injured party is never
given judgment for damages for losses that he could have avoided
by reasonable effort without risk of other substantial loss or
injury.273 This rule is often expressed by the statement that the
injured party has a "duty" to mitigate his damages to the extent
possible. But because there is no judicial penalty for his failure
to make this effort (his recovery will be the same whether he
mitigates his loss or not), it is more accurate to say that he cannot
recover avoidable damages or the increased damages caused by his
failure to mitigate.274 The law does not penalize his inaction; it
merely refuses to compensate him for the loss that he helped to
cause by not avoiding it.
2. Rule of Breach of Contract by Anticipatory
Repudiation (Anticipatory Breach)
The rule of avoidable damages is applicable to the "anticipatory
breach" of a contract by one of the parties.2 75 Under this doctrine,
more correctly called breach of contract by anticipatory repudia-
tion,276 when a party bound by an executory contract repudiates
his obligations or disables himself from performing them before
the time for performance arrives, the promisee has the option to
treat the contract as ended so far as further performance is con-
2735 Corbin § 1039.
27411 Williston § 1353; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 336 (1932).
2755 Corbin § 1053.
27 6 Id.
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cerned and maintain an action at once for damages occasioned by
the breach.277
B. Remedies Available to Lessor Upon Lessee's Abandonment
of Premises and Refusal to Pay Rent
When the lessee under a real property lease abandons the prem-
ises and refuses to pay rent, what remedies are available to the
lssor? The answer to this question involves a determination of
whether or not the principles of "mitigation of damages" and "an-
ticipatory breach" are a part of the law governing leases.
1. Continued Recognition of Lease With No Reletting
(Applicability of Mitigation of Damages Doctrine)
One traditional remedy is for the lessor to continue to recognize
the lease (refuse to accept any surrender) and allow the premises
to remain vacant, suing the lessee to collect rent as it falls due.27
8
This remedy points out the property nature of a lease-in the con-
veyance of land for a term, the lessor need not concern himself
with what use, indeed, if any, is made of the premises. 279 A major-
ity of jurisdictions280 adopt this remedy and hold that a lessor
need not, for the purpose of mitigating the damages recoverable
from a lessee who abandons or fails to occupy the premises, accept
or procure a new lessee during the remainder of the unexpired
term of the lease.
A number of reasons have been given for following this rule.
First, it is often argued that the lessee becomes the owner of the
premises for a term and the lessor need not concern himself with
the lessee's abandonment of his own property.28' Second, the
lessee, by breaching the covenants in his lease, is acting wrong-
27 7RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTS § 318 (1932).
2781 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.99, at 392; 3 Tiffany §902, at 560.
For the proposition that the lessor has no right of action on the rent until
it falls due, see Grayson v. Mixon, 176 Ark. 1123, 5 S.W.2d 312 (1928);
Bradbury v. Higginson, 162 Cal. 602, 123 P. 797 (1912).279See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.41, at 256.2BOAlabama, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania. Other jurisdictions are probably in ac-
cord although the rule is somewhat less certain: Arkansas, Florida, Louis-
iana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, and Texas. See
Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 534 (1968).
281Wright v. Bauman, 239 Or. 410, 398 P.2d 119 (1965).
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fully, and, by so doing, he should not be allowed to impose a duty
on the lessor to relet.28 2 Connected with this reason is the fear
that the lessor would be required to seek out new lessees contin-
ually.28 3 Third, if the lessor were to accept the property and relet
it, a rescission of the lease by operation of law would occur, re-
leasing the lessee from his obligations. 28 4 This reason expresses
a fear that the lessor's actions might be construed to constitute an
unwilling acceptance of a surrender. Fourth, since the parties to
the lease could have placed a duty to mitigate on the lessor, the
absence of such a covenant indicates a lack of desire to do so. And,
fifth, some courts feel obligated to follow this rule as a matter of
stare decisis because many leases presently in effect covering a
substantial amount of real property were prepared in reliance on
this rule.28 5
There are several recognized exceptions to this rule, however.
First, where the lessor re-enters the premises abandoned by the
lessee, there will be imposed on the lessor a duty of accepting or
procuring a new lessee for the purposes of mitigating damages.
In this situation the lessor's claim for general damages is mea-
sured by the difference between the rental stipulated to be paid
and what, in good faith, the lessor is able to recover from a relet-
ting.28 6 Although the lessee's term does not come to an end and
he remains liable on his covenant to pay rent, he is liable only for
the amount of unavoidable loss the lessor sustains, which is the
general contract measure of damages.2s 7 Note the difference be-
tween this situation, where the lessee remains liable under the
lease, and the situation where, because of the lessor's resumption
of possession under such circumstances as to evidence an accept-
ance of the lessee's surrender, the lease comes to an end, extin-
guishing the lessee's liability for rent.288 Second, some courts
have held that if the lease gives the lessor the right to re-enter
282Browne v. Dugan, 189 Ark. 551, 74 S.W.2d 640 (1934).
283Wohl v. Yelen, 22 Ill. App.2d 455, 161 N.E.2d 339 (1959).
284Haycock v. Johnston, 81 Minn. 49, 83 N.W. 494 (1900).2a5Gruman v. Investors Diversified Services, 247 Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d
377 (1956).286Kanter v. Safran, 99 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1958); Annot, 21 A.L.R.3d at
556-61 (1968).
287This exception is an extension of the second remedy available to a
lessor upon the lessee's abandonment of the premises, discussed in Section
VII-B-2 infra.288See Section VII-B-3 infra.
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upon the lessee's abandonment of the premises, the lessor is held
to a duty of mitigating his damages. 28 9 This has the effect of con-
verting a license given in the lease ("may re-enter and relet")
into a duty imposed by law ("must re-enter and relet"). This
exception should be distinguished from the first one in that here
the mere presence of the right of re-entry gives rise to the duty
to mitigate damages; whereas, in the first exception it is the right
of re-entry coupled with an actual re-entry pursuant thereto that
gives rise to the duty. And, third, where the lessor agrees to
mitigate his damages in the lease, or independently thereof, there
exists a duty on his part to do so. 290
There are a number of jurisdictions, however, which follow
the rule that the lessor cannot recover damages caused by his
refusal to accept or procure a new lessee for the purpose of miti-
gating his damages upon the original lessee's abandonment of the
premises. 291 This rule points out the contractual nature of a lease.
If the lease is viewed as a contract for the purpose of determining
damages upon the lessee's default, the obligation placed on the
lessor to mitigate would seem to be no greater than that imposed
on a party under a contract not relating to the occupancy of
land.292
Several reasons have been advanced for utilizing this contractual
rule in the leasehold area. First, it is important that the rules for
awarding damages should be such as to discourage even persons
against whom wrongs have been committed from passively suffer-
ing economic loss which could be averted by reasonable efforts.
293
Second, if mitigation is not required, the lessor is encouraged to
allow his property to remain idle and unproductive. This may
very well be economically undesirable, both from the standpoint
of a reduction of available land for use and also from the stand-
289Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d at 561-63 (1968).
2901d. at 563-69.
29 lowa, Kansas, Michigan, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon,
South Carolina, Utah, and Wisconsin. Illinois and Washington appear to
follow this view although the rule is somewhat less certain. See Annot., 21
A.L.R.3d 534 (1968). See generally, Harvey, A Study to Determine
Whether the Rights and Duties Attendant Upon the Termination of a
Lease Should Be Revised, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1141. 1183-86 (1966).292See Wright v. Bauman, 239 Or. 410, 398 P.2d 119 (1965) ; 1960 U. ILL.
LF. 332.
293C, McCormick, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW oF DAMAGES § 33, at 127
(1935); McCormick, The Riqhts of the Landlord Upon Abandonment of
the Premises by the Tenant, 23 MIcH. L. REv. 211, 222 (1925).
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point of the possible damage done to the land from vandalism,
accidental fire and undetected waste.2 4 Third, many of the pos-
sible disadvantages of requiring a lessor to mitigate his loss have
not been persuasive, in the light of experience:
, [T]he tenant will be liable for the difference between the
rent he had contracted to pay and other rentals obtained by
the landlord. The landlord may also expect to recover costs
which he suffers in order to secure new occupants, whether
he is successful or not. Also, holdings in various jurisdictions
belie the contention that a duty to mitigate might require the
lessor to enter into an undesirable business relationship. The
landlord has not been required to accept tenants who were
financial risks, or who conducted a type of business precluded
by the original lease. Neither have the landlords been re-
quired to shift present tenants into new quarters, nor to alter
their premises.295
In those jurisdictions which hold that a lessor is under a duty
to mitigate the damages caused by the lessee's breach of the lease,
the standard applied in determining whether he has met his obli-
gation is fairly well settled. It is usually said that the lessor must
exercise "due diligence," "reasonable diligence," "ordinary dili-
gence," or "reasonable effort. 296 Whether the standard will be
held satisfied, of course, depends on the circumstances of the par-
ticular case. However, a few general guidelines can be drawn.
First, the lessor has a duty to seek out a new lease by such means
as advertising the property in newspapers, posting signs on the
premises, listing the property with a real estate broker, and show-
ing the property to prospective lessees. 297 Second, a lessor gen-
erally has a duty to accept a new lessee sought out and found by
the original lessee and offered to the lessor.298 However, under
the following circumstances the lessor can justifiably refuse to
accept a new lessee offered by the old lessee: (1) the prospective
lessee is financially unreliable; (2) the prospective lessee proposes
to occupy the premises under terms that vary from the original
294See 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 332, 335; 10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 532, 537 (1966).
29545 WASH. L. REv. 218, 225 (1970) (footnotes omitted) ; see Groll,
Landlord-Tenant: The Duty to Mitigate Dautages, 17 Dn PAUL L. REv. 311,
319 (1968).2 9 6Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d at 575-77 (1968).297Id. at 585-87.
2 9 81d. at 579-84, 587-89.
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tenancy, such as conducting a different type of business, extending
the length of the lease, or occupying a greater area of the lessor's
property.2 99 Finally, the question of whether the lessee or lessor
has the burden of proving a failure or lack of failure on the part
of the lessor to mitigate his damages has been a subject of some
debate. The courts are about equally divided between requiring
the lessor to prove his exercise of due diligence in reletting the
permises and requiring the lessee to prove that the lessor failed
to exercise due diligence in reletting the premises.300
2. Continued Recognition of Lease Coupled With a Reletting
A second remedy available to the lessor is to contniue to recog-
nize the existence of the lease, but re-enter the premises, either
by express permission of the lessee30 1 or permission implied by
law,30 2 and relet for the benefit of the lessee. The problems of
this remedy surround the fact that the lessee remains liable under
the lease, yet cannot regain possession from the second lessee.
This remedy is undesirable from the lessor's standpoint because
a cause of action against the lessee for damages does not accrue
until the end of the original lease term. 30 3 The lessor must depend
on the continued solvency and availability of his defaulting lessee
because an action to recover any portion of the damages will be
dismissed as premature if brought before the end of the original
term.
This remedy also forces the lessor to run an unjustified risk
and leads to an undesirable result. Where the lessor stands aside
when the lessee abandons possession, the lease continues to exist,
and, along with it, the lessee's liability for rent; but, if the lessor
attempts to utilize the premises by resuming possession or reletting
them, he will, unless he is very careful, incur the risk of termi-
nating the lease and with it the liability of the lessee for rent, on
the theory of: (1) surrender; or (2) exercise of the power of
2991d. at 589-94.
300d. at 577-79; 45 WASH. L. Rav. 218, 227-28 (1970).
3 0 1liackett v. Richards, 13 N.Y. 138 (1855); Ogden v. Rowe, 3 E.D.
Smith 312 (N.Y.C.P. 1854); Schnebly, Operative Facts in Surrenders, 22
ILL. L. Rav. 117, 127-28 (1927).
302Schnebly, supra note 29, at 126-27, 130-31; 1 AMERCAN LAa OF PRoP-
ERTY § 3.99, at 394.303See Harvey, supra note 19, at 1184.
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forfeiture, where that is reserved in the lease; or (3) eviction. 30 4
Many decisions assume that if the lease has been terminated in any
of these three ways it necessarily follows that the lessee escapes
all liability for loss thereafter accruing to the lessor.A0s
3. Termination of Lease (Applicability of
Anticipatory Breach Doctrine)
The above-mentioned assumption that the termination of the
lease ends the lessee's liability for rent thereafter accruing leads
to a consideration of the third remedy available to the lessor. This
remedy allows the lessor to consider the lease terminated and
thereby end privity of estate between lessor and lessee. 306 A sur-
render of forfeiture brings to an end the relation of lessor and
lessee, and, consequently, prevents the accrual thereafter of any
obligation imposed by law by virtue of the lessee's status as lessee.
Viewing a lease as a conveyance of an interest in land for a term,
the doctrine of "anticipatory breach" cannot be applied to this
type of situation because of the view that rent reserved under a
lease is not an obligation owing presently, payable in the future,
but an obligation arising out of the actual occupancy of the land
which is contingent on numerous conditions arising out of the
lessor-lessee relationship.30 7 This view expresses the property
nature of this remedy.
However, a lease has a dual nature, creating both privity of
estate (a property relationship) between the parties and privity
of contract (a contractual relationship) between the parties. This
second relationship imposes personal obligations on each of the
parties to carry out the terms of any promises or covenants that
may be made in connection with the lease. Thus, even if the lessee
is no longer liable on the lease because of lack of privity of estate,
he may still be liable as a party to a contract. It has been argued
that this principle should cause the doctrine of "anticipatory
breach" to be applicable where a lessee fails or refuses, after
3o4See McCormick, The Rights of the Landlord Upon Abandonment of
the Premises by the Tenant, 23 MicH. L. REv. 211, 212-16 (1925).
30STiff any, §§ 902, 903, 906.
3061 AMERICAN LAW OF PRoPERTY § 3.99, at 394.307Re McAllister-Mohler Co., 46 F.2d 91 (S.D. Ohio 1930); People ex
rel. Nelson v. West Town State Bank, 373 Ill. 106, 25 N.E.2d 509 (1940).
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abandonment of premises, to pay rent or authorize the lessor to
relet the premises:
Assuming the destruction of the relation and of the tenant's
estate, it is submitted that the landlord's acts [of re-entry or
reletting] show no desire on his part to rescind or terminate
the contract between the parties; they are, on the contrary,
perfectly consistent with an intent on his part to hold the
tenant liable as for a breach of contract. Usually the tenant's
abandonment has been accompanied by some present breach
of covenant to pay rent, to repair, or the like, or even if not,
his abandonment ought, it seems, to constitute an anticipatory
breach, a repudiation in advance of his future obligations
under the contract, and hence under the overwhelming weight
of authority, the source of a cause of action in favor of the
lessor for the value of the further performance of the contract.
The value of such performance is of course the amount of the
rent for the balance of the term, less the reasonable rental
value or the amount received by the landlord upon the re-
letting.3 08
A number of jurisdictions have adopted this view of the lessor's
rights upon an abandonment of the premises and a refusal to pay
rent by the lessee.3°9 Viewing the lease as a contract as well as a
conveyance allows the lessor to recover damages instead of grap-
pling with the problems of rent not yet due. Galvin v. Lovel310
illustrates this approach. The lessor leased premises to the lessee
for a one-year term (Nov. 1, 1947 to Nov. 1, 1948). On May 13,
1948, the lessee gave notice to the lessor of his intention to aban-
don the lease immediately and thereafter abandoned the premises;
at this time the rent was paid up to June 1. The lessor brought
308McCormick, supra note 303, at 216-17 (footnotes omitted).
309Grayson v. Mixon, 176 Ark. 1123, 5 S.W.2d 312 (1928); Sagamore
Corp. v. Willcutt, 120 Conn. 315, 180 A. 464 (1935); Curran v. Smith-
Zollinger, 18 Del. Ch. 220, 157 A. 432 (1931); Chavin v. H. H. Rosin &
Co., 246 A.2d 921 (Del. 1968); Wilson v. National Refining Co., 126 Kan.
139, 266 P. 941 (1928); Minneapolis Baseball Co. v. City Bank, 74 Minn.
98, 76 N.W. 1024 (1898); Weir v. Cooper, 122 Miss. 225, 84 So. 184 (1920) ;
Novak v. Fontaine Furniture Co., 84 N.H. 93, 146 A. 525 (1929); Teeter
v. Mid-West Enterprise Co., 174 Okla. 644, 52 P.2d 810 (1935); In re
Reading Iron Works, 150 Pa. 369, 24 A. 617 (1892) ; Marathon Oil Co. v.
Edwards, 96 'S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936, error dism.); Brown v.
Hayes, 92 Wash. 300, 159 P. 89 (1916); Jones v. McQuestion, 172 Wash.
480, 20 P.2d 838 (1933) ; Pollock v. Ives Theatres, Inc., 174 Wash. 65, 24
P.2d 396 (1933); Galvin v. Lovell, 257 Wis. 82, 42 N.W.2d 456 (1950).
310257 Wis. 82, 42 N.W.2d 456 (1950).
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action against the lessee on May 26. The lessor took possession
of the premises after June 1, and attempted unsuccessfully to relet
them and during the middle of June started occupying the prem-
ises for himself. The Wisconsin Supreme Court modified the trial
court's judgment in the lessor's favor for the balance of the rent
due under the lease from June 1 to November 1 by cutting the
amount to one month's (June) rent. The court held, however,
that the lessee's action on May 13, 1948, constituted an "anticipa-
tory breach" of the lease, giving the lessor a right to treat the
lease as terminated as far as further performance was concerned
and an immediate cause of action for damages caused by the
breach. The court also held that the lessor must use reasonable
diligence to relet the premises in order to reduce the damages
resulting from the lessee's breach of the lease.
The doctrine of breach by anticipatory repudiation should be
distinguished from the doctrine of partial breach coupled with
renunciation. "Anticipatory breach" presupposes that at the time
of renunciation no executory covenant of the lease is due, and,
consequently, there is no default in performance. Partial breach
of lease coupled with repudiation of the lease presupposes that the
covenant to pay rent has matured and that there has been a default
in its performance, and considers the question of whether such
default, when accompanied or followed by a repudiation of the
entire lease, amounts to a total breach of the lease so as to allow
the lessor to recover not only the rent in default, but also for
damages for failure to pay future rent.3 11
Less confusion has arisen in cases where the lessee has breached
his executory agreement to execute a lease or has refused to take
possession of the leased premises. In these cases courts have
uniformly held that the lessor has an immediate cause of action
for the full amount of damages, present and prospective, which
are the necessary and direct result of the violation of the con-
311See 11 Williston § 1315; Bradbury v. Higginson, 162 Cal. 602, 123 P.
797 (1912) ; Sagamore Corp. v. Willcutt, 120 Conn. 315. 180 A. 464 (1935).
The doctrine of acceleration should also be considered in this area. This
doctrine recognizes the validity of a provision that upon the lessee's default
in the payment of rent or his discontinuing business or the commencement
of bankruptcy proceedings against him, the entire rent for the remainder of
the term shall become immediately due and payable. See 1 AMRICA LAW
OF PRoPERTY § 3.74.
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tract.312 The courts apply general contract-law principles, holding
that no estate has ever passed to the lessee. The measure of dam-
ages is the difference between the rent fixed in the lease and the
rental value of the premises for the entire term, at the time of the
breach, together with such special damages as the lessor may plead
and prove to have resulted from the breach. 313
C. Lessee's Bankruptcy as Constituting Anticipatory Breach
A problem similar to that dealing with breach of a lease by
anticipatory repudiation arises in cases involving a bankrupt
lessee. It involves the question of whether the lessor has a prov-
able claim for future rental losses when the trustee in bankruptcy
refuses to adopt the lease.
As far as contracts in general are concerned, it is well estab-
lished that a promisee can file a claim for anticipated losses due
to the promisor's bankruptcy. Two different bases have been
advanced for this right in the promisee. The view of the federal
judiciary has been that a provable claim against the bankrupt
party to the contract exists because bankruptcy operates as an
"anticipatory breach" of the contract.314 On the other hand, the
American Law Institute has taken the position that although bank-
ruptcy of the promisor is not an "anticipatory breach" of his obli-
gations under the contract, his contractual obligation is capable
of evaluation and should be provable. 315 Under either theory,
however, the result is the same. Although originally treated quite
differently, a real property lease has now been brought into align-
ment with other executory contracts in so far as bankruptcy is
concerned.
Under the Federal Bankruptcy Act of 1898, a lessor had no
provable claim against the bankrupt lessee's estate for rent accru-
ing after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy when the lease
was not assumed by the trustee. The basis for this was the same
312Monger v. Lutterloh, 195 N.C. 274, 142 S.E. 12 (1928) ; Simon v. Kirk-
patrick, 141 S.C. 251, 139 S.E. 614 (1927; Massie v. State National Bank of
Vernon, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 280, 32 S.W. 797 (1895); Oldfield v. Angeles
Brewing & Malting Co., 62 Wash. 260, 113 P. 630 (1911); Annot., 137
A.L.R. 432 (1942).
313Simon v. Kirkpatrick, 141 S.C. 251, 139 S.E. 614 (1927).314Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 240 U.S. 581 (1916);
see 3A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 63.31 (14th ed. 1969).31 5RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 324 & comment (1932).
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reason advanced by courts adopting the rule that there can be
no breach of a lease of real property by anticipatory repudiation:
future rent reserved under a lease is not an obligation owing pres-
ently, but an obligation not owed until the time stipulated for
the payment arrives. 316
Not only was future rent, as such, not a provable claim in bank-
ruptcy, but also, courts consistently held that a covenant in a lease
giving the lessor the right to re-enter and relet the premises and
providing that the lessee should indemnify the lessor against any
loss of rent incurred by such termination, could not be made the
basis of a proof of debt against the estate of the lessee in bank-
ruptcy for future rent because of the contingent character of the
claim, regardless of whether the re-entry occurred before the
filing of the bankruptcy 317 or after.318 Neither could such a claim
for future rent be successfully maintained where the lease provided
for ipso facto termination upon bankruptcy of the lessee and gave
the lessor a right to recover an amount equal to the rent for the
balance of the term.3 19 However, where the lease provided that
the bankruptcy of the lessee would ipso facto terminate the lease
and that the lessor would be entitled to recover an amount equal
to the rent reserved for the balance of the term, less the fair rental
value of the premises, a claim based on such amount was held
provable on the theory that the provision was for liquidated
damages and not for rent reserved under the lease or for a pen-
alty.320 Although technically sound,32 1 this distinction was opposed
to policies underlying the disposition of bankrupt estates and
was changed by amendments to the Bankruptcy Act. 322
In 1934 the Bankruptcy Act was amended 23 by adding a clause
which made provable "claims for damages respecting executory
contracts including future rents, whether the bankrupt be an indi-
vidual or a corporation." The amended Act was construed to give
316Manhatten Properties v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U.S. 320 (1934), re-
hearing denied, 292 U.S. 607 (1934).3 17Miller v. Irving Trust Co., 296 U.S. 256 (1935).
318Manhatten Properties v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U.S. 320 (1934), rehear-
ing denied, 292 U.S. 607 (1934).
319Kothe v. R. C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224 (1929).
32OIrving Trust Co. v. A. W. Perry, Inc., 293 U.S. 307 (1934).32ISee 1 AMERICArN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.98, at 389.322 Bennett, The Modern Lease-An Estate in Land or a Contract (Darn-
ages for Anticipatory Breach and Interdependence of Covenants), 16 TEX.
L. REv. 47, 60 (1937).
323Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, 48 Stat. 911, 923.
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a lessor a provable claim for damages, subject to a limitation on
the amount of the claim, where the trustee in bankruptcy elected
to reject the lease. 324 A lessor had a provable claim under these
circumstances whether the lease contained a covenant of indem-
nity or not.3
25
The 1934 Amendment was changed in 1938 to read as follows:
Debts of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against
his estate which are founded upon . . . (9) claims for antici-
patory breach of contracts, executory in whole or in part, in-
cluding unexpired leases of real or personal property: Pro-
vided, however, That the claim of a landlord for damages for
injury resulting from the rejection of an unexpired lease of
real estate or for damages or indemnity under a covenant
contained in such lease shall in no event be allowed in an
amount exceeding the rent reserved by the lease, without ac-
celeration, for the year next succeeding the date of the slir-
render of the premises to the landlord or the date of reentry
of the landlord, whichever occurs first, whether before or after
bankruptcy, plus an amount equal to the unpaid rent accrued,
without acceleration, up to such date .... 326
Therefore, today, a lease of real property is treated as other con-
tracts are in so far as the doctrine of breach of anticipatory repudi-
ation is concerned, with the exception of the limitation on the
amount of the claim.327 It has been said that, "where the transac-
tion actually amounts to a lease ... § 70b [of the Bankruptcy Act]
applies to such lease the same rules enunciated with respect to
executory contracts in general. '3 28 In re Winn Shoe Co. 3 29 points
out the distinction between the Bankruptcy Act's treatment of a
lease of real property as a contract for the purpose of applying
the "anticipatory breach" doctrine and the common law treatment
of a lease as a conveyance rather than a contract. In that case
the lessee was adjudicated a bankrupt and the trustee rejected
the lease. The lessor re-entered and relet the premises. The lease
contained no covenant relating to reletting or indemnity and the
324Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. v. Whiteside, 110 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1940).
325City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 433, 441
(1937).
32611 U.S.C. § 103(a) (9) (1964).
327For a discussion of this limitation, see Bennett, supra note 327. at 60-61.
3284A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 70.44[4], at 548 (14th ed. 1969).
32987 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1937).
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trustee contended that under the law of the situs (Maine), the
lessor's re-entry and reletting effected a surrender by operation
of law and released the bankrupt from any further liability for
future rents. The court rejected the trustee's contention, stating
that it was unnecessary to consider the dispute as to the state law
because the 1934 Amendment to the Bankruptcy Act (also found
in the present Bankruptcy Act) had made provable the claim of
a lessor for injury resulting from the rejection by the trustee of
an unexpired lease of real estate, notwithstanding the re-entry
and reletting.
VIII. IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE AND
FRUSTRATION OF PURPOSE DOCTRINES
The connected doctrines of impossibility of performance and
frustration of purpose have long been a part of the law of con-
tracts. They also play a part in the law of real property leases.
A portion of this section acts as a companion to Section IV.
There the subject of leases rendered impossible to perform because
of existing legal impediments was discussed under the heading of
Illegal Contracts; here the subject of leases rendered impossible to
perform because of supervening legal impediments is discussed.
A. Contract Principles
The early English common law did not recognize impossibility
as an excuse for failure to perform a promise on the basis that the
parties could have provided against any and all contingencies, and,
if they did not do so, the law would not remake their bargain for
them.330 This attitude reflects the theories of freedom of contract
and stability of contracts, discussed earlier,33' which have been so
engrained in the law of contracts. Gradually, however, the judi-
ciary has departed from this position in certain areas.
There are three classes of cases in which it is well settled today
that the promisor will be excused from performance unless he
either expressly agrees in the contract to assume the risk of per-
formance, whether possible or not, or the impossibility is due to
330Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (1647) ; 3 J. Kent, CoM-
mENTARIES 466 (14th ed. 1896).33 1 See Section VI-A supra.
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his fault: (1) impossibility due to domestic law; (2) impossi-
bility due to the death or illness of one who by the terms of the
contract is to do an act requiring his personal performance; and
(3) impossibility due to fortuitous destruction or change in char-
acter of something to which the contract relates, or which by the
terms of the contract is made a necessary means of performance. 332
When the word "impossibility" is used, extreme and unreasonable
difficulty, expense, injury or loss is meant, rather than scientific
or actual impossibility. 33" A fourth class of cases, which does not
fall strictly within the boundaries of impossibility, has emerged
as being subject to the same principles as the first three. The
name "frustration of purpose" has been given to this class." 4
Performance remains literally possible, but the entire value of the
performance to one or more of the parties and the basic reason
for entering into the contract has been destroyed by a supervening
and unforeseen event. Two conditions must be present before
this doctrine will be applied: (1) the risk must be one that the
parties would not have expected the promisor to assume if they
had considered the matter in advance; and (2) the frustration
must be full and complete-it is not sufficient that the contract is
rendered unprofitable by the subsequent change of circumstances. 333
B. Real Property Leases
1. Impossibility Due to Domestic Law
The doctrine of impossibility of performance 36 has been applied
in the leasehold area when domestic law renders any further per-
missible use of the premises illegal. This doctrine will apply only
where the use of the premises is restricted to that use which be-
comes illegal because of the enactmnt of legislation by the federal,
state or local government. If only one of several permissible uses
33 2See 6. S. Williston, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1935, at
5418-19 (rev. ed. S. Williston & G. Thompson 1938).
333d. § 1931, at 5410.
3341d. § 1935, at 5418-19,333See 43 MICH. L. Ray. 598 (1944).
3361t is arguable that the correct doctrine applicable to this situation is
"frustration of purpose." Since the lessee is not ordinarily required to oc-
cupy and use the premises, and since he can still pay rent, performance of
his obligation has not been rendered truly "impossible." See 1 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.104, at 401.
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becomes illegal, the doctrine will not apply.3 37 If the statement of
uses in the lease is permissive and not restrictive, legislation
making the use illegal will not result in application of the doctrine
of impossibility.338 And, if what is made illegal may be made legal
through administrative or judicial action, the doctrine will not
apply.33 9
The Eighteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
prohibiting the manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating
liquors, brought the doctrine of impossibility into play. Industrial
Development & Land Co. v. Goldschmidt340 illustrates the effect
of this Amendment on certain leases. In 1915 the lessor leased
to the lessee premises for a term of five years, restricting the use
of the premises to that of a winery and wholesale and retail liquor
business. When the Eighteenth Amendment became effective, the
lessee tendered the unpaid rental up to that effective date and
considered the lease terminated. The lessor sued for the rent
owing for the remainder of the term, arguing that a lessee is not
relieved from his contract because the only use to which the prem-
ises may be put becomes thereafter unlawful. The court, recog-
nizing the authority sustaining the lessor's position, stated that the
lessee's position ". . . places the argument on a sounder basis,
and points to a fundamental rule of the law of contracts,"3 41 and
held that the lease was terminated by the Amendment and the
lessee was liable for rent only until its effective date.
Restrictions on the importation and sale of enemy goods during
World War II also brought the doctrine of impossibility into play.
in 119 Fifth Avenue, Inc. v. Taiyo Trading Co. 42 the lessor, in
1940, leased premises to the lessee for three years by a lease re-
stricting the use of the premises to the sale of Japanese, Chinese
and Orintal goods. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Alien
Property Custodian, acting pursuant to government authority, pad-
3371 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.44 n. 4, at 266.3381d. n. 6 & 7.339Id, n. 11.
34056 Cal. App. 507, 206 P. 134 (1922) ; accord, Kaiser v. Zeigler, 115
Misc. 281, 187 N.Y.S. 638 (Sup. Ct., App. Term 1921); Doherty v. Mon-
roe-Eckstein Brewing Co., 198 App. Div. 708, 191 N.Y.S. 59 (1921).
341206 P. at 135.
34273 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Sup. Ct., Special Term 1947), aff'd, 275 App. Div.
695, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949); accord, Schantz v. American Auto Supply
Co., 178 Misc. 909, 36 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Gardiner Properties,
Inc. v. Samuel Leidner & Son, Inc., 279 App. Div. 470, 111 N.Y.S.2d 88
(1952).
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locked the premises and took possession of the contents. The
lessee, although a domestic corporation, was a foreign national,
since a majority of its stock was owned by Japanese nationals.
The lessee vacated the premises and refused to pay further rent;
therefore, the lessor sued for accrued rent. The court applied
the doctrine of frustration of purpose to the facts, stating:
o . . [T]here are cases which refuse to apply the doctrine
of frustration to leases, on the ground that an estate is con-
veyed to the lessee which carries with it all the risks ...
[But] the modern cases apply the doctrine to all contracts,
including leases, especially where, as has been stated, there
has been a total or nearly total destruction of the purpose for
which, in the contemplation of the parties, the lease was exe-
cuted .... Similarly, the courts of this state have repeatedly
applied the doctrine to leases.3 43
On the state level, as on the federal, prohibition caused the
doctrine of impossibility to become connected often with real
property leases. Greil Bros. Co. v. Mabson344 illustrates the way
court have dealt with the leasehold problems caused by state
prohibition. In 1907 the lessor leased premises to the lessee "for
occupation as a bar and not otherwise." Alabama passed a pro-
hibition act in 1909, whereupon, the lessee vacated the premises,
claiming that the lease was ended. When the lessor sued to re-
cover rent accruing after the effective date of the prohibition act,
the Alabama Supreme Court ruled in favor of the lessee, holding
that the fact forbade the very business and purpose for which the
property was leased, and, that, under general contract law prin-
ciples, the lessee-promisor was relieved of his obligation to pay
rent.
In the area of eminent domain, it is generally held that when
the entire leased premises are taken the lessee's covenant to pay
rent is discharged.3 45 One theory that has been used to justify
34373 N.Y.S2d at 778.
344179 Ala. 444, 60 So. 876 (1913) ; accord, Kahn v. Wilhelm, 118 Ark.
239, 177 S.W. 403 (1915); Hooper v. Mueller, 158 Mich. 595, 123 N.W. 24
(1909); Heart v. East Tennessee Brewing Co., 121 Tenn. 69, 113 S.W. 364
(1908); The Stratford, Inc. v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 94 Wash.
125, 162 P. 31 (1916); Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Seattle Brewing
& Malting Co., 98 Wash. 12, 167 P. 58 (1917).
3452 P. Nichols, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.23[31, at 5-98 (3d
ed. J. Sackman & P. Rohan 1970).
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this result is that of impossibility of performance. In 2814 Food
Corp. v. Hub Bar Building Corp.3 46 the lessor leased premises to
the lessee for ten years for use as a supermarket with an option
in the lessee to renew the lease for eleven years. While the
lessee was making installations of improvements, and had not yet
gone into possession, the city gave notice of intent to condemn
the land for school purposes. The lessee sued the lessor for a
return of rent paid and the court rendered judgment for the lessee,
holding that the action of the city in condemning the property
frustrated the lease contract of the parties.
The New York Multiple Dwelling Law was held in O'Neil v.
Derderian347 to bring a lease to an end on the basis of impossi-
bility of performance. The lessor had leased a building to the
lessee "to be used and occupied only for furnished rooms." When
this use subsequently became illegal because of the enactment of
the Multiple Dwelling Law, it was held, when the lessor brought
suit for rent accruing after passage of the Law, that the lease was
ended because its purpose had become prohibited.
Municipal regulations have also had the effect of ending a lease
on the basis of impossibility of performance. In McCullough
Realty Co. v. Laemmle Film Service348 the lessee leased premises
"for Film Exchange and theater supplies purposes only." During
the term of the lease, Davenport, Iowa, where the premises were
located, passed an ordinance making it unlawful to manufacture,
keep, store, handle, or repair any inflammable motion picture films
in buildings that were not fireproof. The building under lease fell
within the prohibition of the ordinance. The lessee was able to
prove that ninety-seven percent (97%) of its business was han-
dling films. When the lessor sued to collect rent, the court agreed
with the lessee that its obligation to pay rent terminated because
it was deprived of the beneficial use of the premises due to a
subsequent change in the law.
In Manger v. Mills349 the lessee had leased a pier to be used
"for the purpose of landing passenger boats only." During the
term of the lease the Village of Rye, New York passed an ordi-
nance which prohibited the lessee from using the pier unless the
34659 Misc.2d 80, 297 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct., Trial Term 1969).
347138 Misc. 488, 246 N.Y.S. 341 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1930).
348181 Iowa 594. 165 N.W. 33 (1917).
349137 Misc. 535, 242 N.Y.S. 705 (N.Y. City Ct., Special Term 1930).
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written consent of the village trustees was first obtained. The
lessee applied to the trustees for permission and was refused.
Later, when the lessor sued for unpaid rent, the court ruled in
favor of the lessee on the basis that the passage of the law subse-
quent to the execution of the lease rendered performance of the
lease impossible.
In Hizington v. Eldred Refining Co.350 the lessee leased prem-
ises "for the distribution and sale of gasoline, oil, greases and
petroleum products." During the term of the lease the Syracuse,
New York, Commissioner of Public Safety adopted various regu-
lations governing storage and handling of gasoline and other ex-
plosives. The leased premises could no longer be used for the
purposes for which they were rented without violating these regu-
lations. When the lessor sued the lessee for unpaid rent, the court
agreed with the lessee that the lease had become void and no
recovery could be had on it.
2. Impossibility Due to Destruction of Premises
The doctrine of impossibility of performance 3s has also been
applied in the leasehold area when there is a destruction of the
premises. That the doctrine has been adopted demonstrates a dis-
satisfaction with the common law rule generally applied in this
area: a lease is not terminated by the destruction of a building
on the leased premises, although the building may be the principal
subject matter of the lease. 352 One reason behind this general rule
is based on the view that a lease is a conveyance and not a con-
tract. Since the lessee has received his estate upon execution of
the lease, he is the owner of a term and must pay, in the form of
rent, for what he has purchased. 35 3 A second reason for the gen-
eral rule is based on the view that rent issues out of the land, and,
so long as the land remains, the lessee's obligation to pay rent
continues.
There are several reasons why this rule is a harsh one.3 54 First,
although the lessee may insure his interest, the lessee of a short
term often does not, causing any loss due to a destruction of the
350235 App. Div. 486, 257 N.Y.S. 464 (1932).35ISee note 336 supra.
3521 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.103.
3531d,
3541d. at 398.
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premises to fall heavily on him. Second, the lessor is usually in
a better position to carry the risk of loss. And, third, the lessee
does bargain for the day-to-day use of the premises. These rea-
sons have caused American courts to depart from the general rule
in some areas and apply the doctrine of impossibility of per-
formance.
This doctrine is applied when there is a destruction of the realty
that forms the subject matter of the lease. In Waite v. O'Neil 355
the lessor owned lots, one side of which consisted of a river bluff
which descended to a "footing" or "landing" which was below
the high water mark of the river but above the low water mark
of the river. This "landing" was leased to the lessee for the pur-
pose of mooring, storing and unloading coal, wood and ice barges
or boats. During the term of the lease certain government works
up the river gave way because of a strong current and high water,
causing an uncontrollable current to pound the bluff, causing it to
collapse. The "landing" was completely destroyed. All that re-
mained of the lessor's lots was a narrow fringe that presented a
vertical bluff eighty feet above water which, because of its depth
and strength of current, made it dangerous to land barges or boats.
The lessee treated the lease as terminated; the lessor then sued to
recover the rent for the balance of the term. The trial court's de-
termination that the lease continued and was not terminated by the
destruction of the "landing" was reversed by the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals. In holding that the lease was termi-
nated by the destruction of the "landing," the court pointed out
that the general rule applied in cases where improvements upon
realty are destroyed is based on the theory that the subject of the
lease is the land, the improvements being a mere incident. But in
this case, since the subject matter of the lease was the "landing,"
its destruction caused the lease to end and ended the lessee's lia-
bility for rent.
The doctrine of impossibility of performance is applied when
there is a destruction of a building that is leased separate and
apart from any realty. In Davis v. Shepperd356 the lessee leased
35576 F. 408 (6th Cir. 1896); accord, Gamble-Robinson Co. v. Buzzard,
65 F.2d 950 (8th Cir. 1933).
356196 Ark. 302, 117 S.W 2d 337 (1938); accord, Pizitz-Smolian Co-op
Stores v. Randolph, 221 Ala. 458, 129 So. 26 (1930) ; Whittaker v. Holmes,
165 Ark. 1, 263 S.W. 788 (1924); Norman v. Stark G. & E. Co., 237 S.W.
963 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922, error ref'd).
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the "business house located on the E Yz of Lot 4 in Block 2 on
Main Street in the City of Clarksville, Arkansas." When the
building was destroyed by fire during the lease, the lessee refused
to pay rent accruing thereafter, and the lessor sued to recover this
rent. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that there is a well rec-
ognized exception to the general rule to the effect that where
performance depends on the continued existenc of the building
leased and the building is destroyed so that it cannot be used for
the purposes for which it was leased, the consideration for the
lease contract fails and the lessee is no longer obligated to pay rent.
The same rule is applied when only a portion of a building is
leased. In Ainsworth v. Ritt 35 7 the lessor owned a building lo-
cated on ground owned by the City of Stockton, California. The
lessee leased the west half of the building. One month after the
lease was executed ,the building was demolished by a third person
without the consent of either the lessor or lesse. The lessor failed
in his effort to recover rent accruing after this demolition, the
court holding that since the lease was of a portion of the building
and not of the land upon which it rested, a destruction of the
building, the subject matter of the lease, terminated the lease and
no action could be maintained by the lessor for rent accruing
subsequent to the destruction of the building.
In the recent case of Crowe Lumber & Building Materials Co.
v. Washington County Library Board358 the lessee leased "the
street level floor only" of a building which was accidentally de-
stroyed during the term of the lease by fire. The lease contained
no provision excusing the lessee from rent in event of fire or other
damage, nor any covenant requiring the lessor to rebuild. The
court ruled in the lessee's favor in a suit brought by the lessor for
rent accruing after the building's destruction. The court rea-
soned that the lease of a floor in the building did not grant to
the lessee any interest in the land, and, in the absence of any
covenant to rebuild or any provision regarding termination be-
cause of destruction of the premises, the lease was terminated
because of the destruction of the subject matter of the lease.
Most of the cases in this area have dealt with the effect of a
building's destruction on the lease of a room within the building.
35738 Cal. 89 (1869).358428 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968).
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Womack v. McQuarry 59 is illustrative of the approach taken by
courts to this situation. Here the lessee leased a sawmill and one
room in an adjoining factory building from the lessor. Both the
sawmill and the factory building were accidentally destroyed by
fire. Upon the lessee's refusal to pay rent, the lessor sued to re-
cover rent accruing after the fire. The court held that the lessee
was still liable for the rent on the sawmill, but was not liable
for the rent on the room in the adjacent building which had been
destroyed . The court adopted the general rule in holding the lessee
liable for rent on the sawmill. But as to the lessee's liability on
the room in the building destroyed, the court said:
There are, however, some . . . cases in which an exception
to this [general] rule has been held to exist .... This excep-
tion applies only to cases where the demise is of part of an
entire building, as a cellar or upper room; and it is founded
upon the idea that in such cases it is not the intention of the
lease to grant any interest in the land, save for the single
purpose of the enjoyment of the apartment demised, and that
when that enjoyment becomes impossible, by reason of the
destruction of the building, there remains nothing upon which
the demise can operate.3 60
Many jurisdictions have enacted legislation dealing with the
effect on leases of destruction of the premises. The New York
statute is typical of the way many states have modified the general
common law rule. It provides:
Where any building, which is leased or occupied, is de-
stroyed or so injured by the elements, or any other cause as
to be untenantable, and unfit for occupancy, and no express
agreement to the contrary has been made in writing, the
lessee or occupant may, if the destruction or injury occurred
without his fault or neglect, quit and surrender possession of
the leasehold premises, and of the land so leased or occupied;
and he is not liable to pay to the lessor or owner rent for the
35928 Ind. 103 (1867) ; accord, McMillan v. Solomon, 42 Ala. 356 (1868) ;
Alexander v. Dorsey, 12 Ga. 12 (1852); Winston v. Cornish, 5 Ohio 477
(1832); Harrington v. Watson, 11 Or. 143, 3 P. 173 (1884) ; Stockwell v.
Hunter, 11 Met. Mass. 448 (1847) ; Shawmut Nat'l Bank v. City of Boston,
118 Mass. 125 (1875); Graves v. Berdan, 26 N.Y. 498 (1863); Moving
Picture Co. of America v. Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co., 224 Pa. 358, 90
A. 642 (1914).
36028 Ind. at 104.
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time subsequent to the surrender. Any rent paid in advance
or which may have accrued by the terms of a lease or any
other hiring, shall be adjusted to the date of such surrender. 361
Somewhat different approaches have been taken to the problem
in other jurisdictions. The California statute places the duty to
make repairs on the lessor, except where the damage is due to the
lessee's negligence, and provides that if the lessor fails to repair
within a reasonable time, the lessee may vacate and be discharged
from liability under the lease.362 The Louisiana statute provides
that the lease ends if the property is destroyed by an unforeseen
event, and, that if the property is partly destroyed, the lessee may
demand a diminution in rent or a revocation of the lease. 363 The
North Carolina statute provides that if a building, the use of
which was the main inducement to the lease, is destroyed or so
damaged that it cannot be repaired except at a cost exceeding
one year's rent, the lessee can surrender his estate in the premises
within ten days after the destruction and be discharged. 364
IX. CONFLICT OF LAWS DOCTRINE
The dual nature of a real property lease plays an important role
in conflict of laws problems. Whether the controversy revolves
around a property aspect of the lease or a contractual aspect of
the lease affects the decision of what law is to be applied in a
multijurisdictional situation.
A. Property Nature of a Lease- Lex Loci Rei Sitae
Generally, the validity and effect of a transaction by which a
361N.y. REAL PROP. LAW § 227 (McKinney 1945); see also ARiz. REv.
STAT. § 33-343 (1956); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-24 (1960); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 383.170 (1962) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 53, § 39K 1968) ; MxciH. CoMP.
LAWS § 554.201 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504.05 (1947); Miss. CODE§ 898 (1956); N.J. REv. STAT. § 46:8-6 to 8-7 (1940); OHIO REV. CODE
§ 5301.11 (1971); R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-18-7 (1956); S.D. ComP.
LAWS § 43-32-19 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-702 (1955); VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-226 (1969); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-4-13 (1966); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 234.17 (1957). For construction of these statutes, see I AmERIcAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.103, at 398-99.36ZCAL. CiV. CODE §§ 1941-42 (West 1954); see also MONT. REV. CODE
§§42-108, 109 (1961) ; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-16-12, 13, 14 (1960) ; OKLA.
STAT. tit. 41, §§ 31, 32 (1971).3 6 3LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2697 (1952).
364N. C. GEN. STAT. § 42-12 (1966).
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leasehold interest is created or transferred is governed by the law
of the situs of the land-the lex loci rei sitae.365 If the right in
controversy is in rem, created in the land itself, the law of the
situs of the property will control.
B. Contractual Nature of a Lease - Lex Loci Contractus
However, if the controversy centers on covenants between the
parties to the lease, the contractual rights and liabilities inherent
in them are controlled by the proper law of the contract-the lex
loci contractus.3 66 This is true although the covenants are con-
tained in a contract affecting realty.
Some authorities take the view that both rights in rem created
in the land itself and rights in personam created in the covenants
contained in the lease should be governed by the law of the situs
of the property. It is argued that such a result provides for max-
imum certainty and avoids confusion in solving these problems.
3 67
Also, some authorities believe that such a result would be more
within the contemplation of the parties.3 68
The American Law Institute takes the following position on
this subject:
The contractual duties imposed on the parties to a deed of
transfer of an interest in land are determined, in the absence
of an effective choice of law by the parties, by the local law
of the state where the land is situated unless, with respect to
the particular issue, some other state has a more significant
relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the trans-
action and the parties, in which event the local law of the
other state will be applied.369
In the commentary following this section, it is related to leases
in the following way:
A distinction must be drawn between a transfer of a leasehold
or security interest in the land and contractual questions re-
36$H. Goodrich, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 148, at 293 (4th ed. E. Scoles 1964);
R. Leflar, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 170, at 420-21 (1968).366Goodrich, supra note 365, at § 149, at 296-97; Leflar, supra note 365;
A. Ehrenzweig, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 234, at 614-15 (1962).367Ehrenzweig, supra note 366.
368G. Stumberg, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 345 (3d ed. 1963).
36 9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWs § 190 (1971).
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lated to the transfer of such an interest. The transfer of inter-
ests in land is determined by the law selected by application
of the rule in § 223 [which applies the law of the situs of the
land]. An example of a contractual question related to such a
transfer is whether the lessor can mingle with his own funds
a deposit made by the lessee as security for the payment of
rent. Such contractual questions will be determined by the
law selected by application of the rule of this Section.370
1. Priority of Lessor's Lien for Rent
The cases which have dealt with the subject under discussion
bear out the position of the American Law Institute. There are
certain areas of a real property lease controlled by the lex loci
contractus. In Lee Wilson & Co. v. Fleming3 71 the Arkansas Su-
preme Court dealt with the priority of a lessor's lien for rent over
other liens. The plaintiff-lessor had leased land located in Mis-
sissippi to the lessee by a lease entered into in Arkansas. The
lease, which ran for one year, reserved rent of $1750. The lessor
agreed to furnish the lessee certain farm equipment for which the
lessee agreed to pay an additional rental of $700. The security for
the payment of the rent note and the $700 was the retention of a
lessor's lien upon all crops produced on the land. The lease con-
tained the following clause: "First party [lessor] hereby agrees
to waive his rent to any person . . . for the purpose of allowing
the second party [lessee] to obtain furnish money, to the extent
of . . . $1500. . . ." The defendant furnished $935 to the lessee
and took the crops produced on the leased land as security, relying
on the lessor's waiver. The lessor sued for the amount of the
rent note and the $700, claiming its lien was superior to the de-
fendant's. The court, in holding that the lessor did waive its lien
in favor'of the defendant, relied on the law of Arkansas, stating
that the nature, validity and interpretation of contracts are to be
governed by the law of the place where they are made.
2. Covenant to Pay Rent
In re Newark Shoe Stores, Inc. 372 dealt with the covenant to
3701d. comment e.
371203 Ark. 417, 156 S.W.2d 893 (1941).
3722 F. Supp. 384 (D. C. Md. 1933). See Stumberg, supra note 368, for a
criticism of this case.
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pay rent found in a lease in a multijurisdictional case. The lessor
and lessee entered into a lease of premises located in Chicago,
Illinois. The lessor signed the lease in Chicago and the lessee
signed it in Baltimore, Maryland. The lease stated that rent was
payable in advance in monthly installments. The lessee filed for
bankruptcy and adjudication occurred on February 19, 1932. The
lessee had not occupied the premises in February or paid the
February rent. The referee allowed the lessor's claim for a full
month's rent for February. The court upheld this decision on the
basis that, under Maryland law, rent was not apportionable as to
time. The court relied on Maryland law for the following reasons:
... [Wihat occurred was an offer to lease, made in Illinois,
which was accepted in Maryland, the latter place thereby
becoming the place of execution of the lease. Thus, in so far
as the lease created rights in rem in the land, the law of the
situs of the land governs; but, in so far as the lease created
any rights in personam by virtue of its covenants, the law
of the place of execution governs. . . . Therefore, although
the duty to pay rent is sometimes said to arise out of the land,
it is in fact the covenant to pay rent that is relied upon, that
is, he contractual part of the lease, and, therefore, the appli-
cable law is that of Maryland where the contract to lease was
made.3 73
3. Covenant to Pay Taxes
The covenant to pay taxes contained in a lease is governed by
the lex loci contractus. In United States v. Warren R. Co.374 the
lessors had leased to the defendant-lessees railroad lines by a lease
which obligated the lessees to pay taxes, assessments, and imposi-
tions which might legally be made upon the premises leased and
to pay and discharge all legal claims which might accrue against
the lessors or on account of any matter connected .with the lines
leased. The United States sued to collect from the lessees income
tax owed by the lessors. The court held that, under the lease,
the lessees did not undertake to pay income taxes owed by the
lessors. This decision was based on the view that contractual obli-
gations created by the lease were determined by the law of the
place where the lease was entered into, New York, and, under
3732 F. Supp. at 384.
374127 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1942).
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New York decisions, there was no such clear and specific obliga-
tion to pay income taxes which would be necessary in order to
hold the lessees liable.
4. Covenant Concerning Security Deposit
Another area where the lex loci contractus controls concerns
covenants involving security deposits. In re Barnett37 5 involves a
lease concerning land located in Pennsylvania that was executed
in New York. The lease contained a clause stating that if bank-
ruptcy proceedings were brought by or against the lessee, the
lease would end three days after notice of termination was sent by
the lessor to the lessee and all future installments of rent would
become immediately due and payable. The lessor held $1200 as
a security deposit for performance of the lessee's covenants. After
the lessee became bankrupt, the trustee claimed that the lessor
could only take $625 for accrued rent out of the $1200 and must
return the balance to the trustee. The court held that the pro-
vision in the lease giving the lessor the right to recover the total
amount of the rent for the term less the rent actually paid upon
any default of any covenant was illegal under New York law
because such a provision is regarded as a penalty rather than as
liquidated damages. The court relied on New York law because
the lease was executed in New York and both parties maintained
offices and conducted business there; therefore, the covenant in
controversy, involving the personal rights of the parties, would be
governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the lease was exe-
cuted, the deposit was made and the rent was payable. This case
serves as a good example of a situation envisioned by the Ameri-
can Law Institute where the lex loci contractus of a lease controls
because a state other than the situs of the property has more sig-
nificant relationship to the transaction and the parties.3
76
In Mallory Associates v. Barving Realty Co.3 77 the plaintiff-
lessee leased from the defendant-lessor property located in Vir-
ginia. Both the lessor and lessee were New York corporations
with offices in New York. The lease was executed in New York.
37512 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 699 (1926).376See note 369 supra and accompanying text.
37300 N.Y. 297, 90 N.E.2d 468 (Ct. App. 1949), reh. denied, 300 N.Y.
680, 91 N.E.2d 331 (1950).
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The lease provided that the lessor would hold a security deposit
of $65,000 which could be used toward the purchase of the prop-
erty and that the lessor would return $3000 per year until the
lease expired, provided the lessee was not in default of any of the
terms of the lease. A New York statute378 provided that the se-
curity deposit remained the money of the depositor and should be
held in trust by the depositee and not mixed with his personal
money. The lessor mixed the deposit with personal money and the
lessee sued to recover the deposit on the basis that the statute had
been violated. The court upheld judgment in the lessee's favor,
stating:
The provision in the lease for the deposit of security is a
personal covenant between the contracting parties, creating
rights in personam. It is not concerned with the creation or
transfer of any interest in real property. The question pre-
sented by the instant case relates solely to the rights and lia-
bilities of the parties as a matter of contractual obligation.
Accordingly, it is to be determined by the law governing the
contract even though the subject matter of the contract may
be land in another state.37 9
X. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The nature of a lease of real property has been evolving since
its origin. Early in our legal history, when the great mass of
individuals in England were villeins holding land in unfree tenure,
the interest involved was that of status. Although the status of
the villein holding at the will of his lord was precarious in theory,
the force of manorial custom made it more protected in fact. As
a result of the introduction of the mortgage into capitalism to pro-
vide security for money lending and the effect of the Black Death
on the agricultural labor force, the leasehold interest developed
into a term of years which created contractual rights in the lessee.
The real actions were not originally available to protect a lease-
hold interest, but, during the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries, actions to protect a leasehold evolved which culminated
in the action of ejectment, which ultimately replaced many of the
old forms of action and gave the leasehold interest a predominantly
37"N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 233 (McKinney 1945).
379300 N.Y. at 300-301, 90 N.E2d at 471.
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property characteristic. Since the eighteenth century, however,
changes in English and American society have reintroduced a
contractual aspect into real property leases that has caused the
real property lease to become a blend of property and contract.
The struggle between the property and contractual aspect of
leases is evident in the approach taken to covenants contained
therein. Unlike the rule in the law of contracts, covenants in real
property leases have been generally considered to be mutually
independent unless the covenants are so important as to go to the
whole consideration of the lease. One device that has been used
extensively to bring some flexibility into this area is that of con-
structive eviction. However, the fact that only the lessee may
rely on it and the fact that the lessee must vacate the premises at
his peril have limited the utility of this property doctrine. There
now appears to be a trend toward implying mutual dependency to
important covenants in a lease. Public policy, housing codes and
certain state statutes are being used to achieve this result.
The principle of illegality of contract is one that has long been
applied to leases executed for certain illegal or immoral purposes,
such as the illegal sale of liquor, the illegal conduct of gambling
operations and the illegal conduct of prostitution. More recently,
leases which violate zoning ordinances have been brought under
this rule. And, most recently, this approach has been used in
urban areas where residential leases have substantially violated
municipal housing codes. The last approach demonstrates the en-
largement of traditional remedies given the lessee of sub-standard
housing.
This enlargement of remedies available to the lessee of sub-
standard housing is also apparent in the area of implied warranty
of quality in leases. Based on the view that a lease is a convey-
ance of an estate in land, the common law rule has been that there
is no implied warranty that the premises are habitable or fit for
the purpose intended. Although there have long been some ex-
ceptions made, such as for a short-term lease of furnished premises
and for a lease of premises in the process of construction, not until
substantial strides had been made toward implying warranties in
other transactions such as sales of personalty, leases of personalty
and sales of realty, did any jurisdiction consider implying a war-
ranty of quality in a real property lease. Today, public policy is
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beginning to alter this view, and is being strengthened by state
statutes and housing codes that are being contsrued to imply a
warranty of quality in leases.
The doctrine involving the unenforceability of unconscionable
clauses has had a similar history in leases to that of illegality of
contract. For many years the doctrine has been applied to real
property leases in the guise of strict construction against the
draftsman of the clause. This strict construction approach has
been generally limited to clauses attempting to exculpate the lessor
from the consequences of his own negligence. In situations where
the lessor acts in some capacity other than that of lessor, where his
negligence occurs before entry into the lease, where he commits
affirmative negligence, where his negligence occurs on premises
under his control, or where the injury to the lessee results from
negligence occurring off the demised premises, the lessor has not
been allowed to rely on an exculpatory clause to release him from
liability for his own negligence. More recently, public policy con-
siderations against allowing one to relieve himself of liability for
his own negligence, along with the consideration of whether the
parties are in an approximate equality of bargaining position so
as to prevent the lease from being a contract of adhesion, have
been relied on to void exculpatory clauses. Also, several juris-
dictions have construed municipal codes or state statutes to void
an exculpatory clause.
When a lessee abandons leased premises and refuses to pay rent,
two principles of contract law have affected the remedies to which
the lessor is entitled. First, although a majority of jurisdictions
still recognize the right of the lessor to allow the premises to stand
idle and sue for rent as it falls due, a substantial minority have
adopted the "mitigation of damages" principle and refuse to allow
the lessor to recover damages he could have avoided by exercising
reasonable efforts to obtain a new lessee. Second, some jurisdic-
tions have applied the doctrine of "anticipatory breach" and allow
the lessor to recover total damages immediately upon breach,
based on privity of contract, even though privity of estate may
have ended under the circumstances of the case. The Bankruptcy
Act now follows this approach by considering the bankruptcy of
a lessee to constitute breach of the lease by anticipatory repudia-
tion, assuming the trustee rejects the lease. Consequently, a lessor
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can now enter a provable claim in bankruptcy proceedings.
When unforeseen events arise after entry into the lease which
frustrate the purpose of the parties in entering into the transaction,
the doctrine of impossibility of performance and frustration of
purpose may be applicable. Where federal, state or local law
enacted subsequent to entry into a lease renders any further per-
missible use of the premises illegal, the lease comes to an end.
Also, although as a general rule destruction of a building on leased
premises does not terminate the lease, where there is a destruction
of the land, or where only a building or portion thereof is leased
apart from the land, a destruction of such premises does terminate
the lease. A number of states have modified the general rule by
statute in situations where it might otherwise apply.
In a situation where a lease transaction is a multijurisdictional
one, because a lease is considered a contract as well as a convey-
ance, certain areas of the lease are controlled by the proper law
of the contract, the lex loci contractus. These areas include the
various nonconveyancing aspects of the lease, such as priority of
the lessor's lien, covenants to pay rent, covenants to pay taxes,
and covenants concerning security deposits.
It is difficult to predict the ultimate effect contractual principles
will have on real property leases. However, there is little likeli-
hood the law will draw back from the inroads already made. Un-
less other solutions are found to the contemporary problems sur-
rounding leases, it appears that even greater reliance will be
placed on various principles of contract law. The approach of
treating a lease solely as a conveyance of an estate has failed to
solve many of the problems surrounding leases; likewise, treating
a lease as a contract should not be expected to serve as a panacea
for these problems. Combined, however, these two aspects of the
real property lease make it a more flexible instrument for the
parties involved and for contemporary society in general.
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